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INTRODUCTION 
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., the United States 
Supreme Court held that, in order for a product design to be 
protectable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the product design 
must first acquire a secondary meaning.1  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Scalia reasoned that consumers, as a rule, do not expect a 
product’s design to serve as an indicator of source.2  The Court 
stated that product designs, like colors, do not ordinarily operate as 
source indicators,3 and that is why the Court established its rule 
that a product design must acquire a secondary meaning as a 
precondition to receipt of trade dress protection.4  Professor 
 
 1 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) (“We hold 
that, in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectible [sic], only upon a 
showing of secondary meaning.”); see also Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, 
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1244 (D. Colo. 2009) (applying Wal-Mart Stores for the 
proposition that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a “cause of action against any person 
whose use of a word, symbol or device is likely to cause confusion regarding the source 
or origin of the plaintiff’s goods.”) (citations omitted).    
 2 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213 (reasoning that “[i]n the case of product 
design . . . consumer predisposition to equate the feature with the source does not exist.”). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. at 216; see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological 
Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 614 (1999) (“Trademark law 
regulates only a particular form of meaning.  It deals merely with symbols that identify 
the source of a product and distinguish that [p]roduct from others, and it extends such 
symbols protection solely against confusing imitation.”) (footnotes omitted); see also 1 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8:1 (4th 
ed. 2012) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS] (explaining that a plaintiff asserting 
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Dinwoodie, writing a year earlier, bluntly asserted that the 
Supreme Court’s underlying assumption of fact was untrue: 
[M]any courts adhere to, and implement doctrinally, 
the premise that shapes almost never identify 
source.  This may at present be largely inaccurate, 
but the rigid embedding of social and competitive 
premises unreflective of new visual realities 
threatens to make trademark law in those courts 
wholly unreceptive to evolving social and 
competitive realities.5 
Briefly stated, “secondary meaning” in trademark law refers to 
the convergence of psychological and sociological phenomena.  
Secondary meaning arises when an appreciable number of relevant 
consumers have established a cognitive link between the mark and 
a particular source.6  Thus, whether secondary meaning exists is a 
question of fact.7 
 
a trade dress infringement claim must first prove that the trade dress is either “inherently 
distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.”). 
 5 Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 645. 
 6 See Bonanza Press, Inc. v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 2010 WL 2196112, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 
2010) (“A product’s design has acquired secondary meaning if there is a ‘mental 
association by a substantial segment of consumers and potential customers ‘between the 
alleged mark and a single source of the product.’’”) (citations omitted); Shell Trademark 
Mgmt. B.V. v. Warren Unilube, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 884, 895 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“With 
regard to ‘secondary meaning,’ courts inquire into ‘the public’s mental association 
between the mark and the alleged mark holder’ to determine whether ‘in the minds of the 
public, the primary significance of a mark is to identify the source of the product rather 
than the product itself.’”) (citations omitted); Fiji Water Co. v. Fiji Mineral Water USA, 
L.L.C., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“A trade dress has secondary 
meaning when ‘in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature . 
. . is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.’”) (citations 
omitted); Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 247 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(“Secondary meaning occurs when, in the minds of the public, the primary significance 
of a mark is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.”) (citations 
omitted); see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 15:7 (“As an elusive 
intellectual synthesis of psychology and law, secondary meaning has been defined in 
many ways throughout the years.  For example, secondary meaning has been said to be 
created in a mark . . . when an ‘association in the minds of a substantial portion of the 
consuming public of the trademark with the product of the alleged proprietor’ is 
created[.]”) (footnote omitted). 
 7 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 15:29 (“Whether or not a designation 
has acquired secondary meaning is a question of fact, not an issue of law.”). 
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The Wal-Mart case separates the universe of trade dress into at 
least two (and perhaps three) subcategories.8  The Court 
acknowledged that, as a rule, trade dress may be protectable 
without proof of secondary meaning.9  The Court cites its Two 
Pesos decision for that proposition.10  Furthermore, the Court 
distinguishes between two subcategories of trade dress: product 
design versus product packaging.11  Product packaging, according 
to the Court, may operate as protectable trade dress without a 
showing of secondary meaning because, as with word marks, 
consumers are prone readily to associate the external 
accoutrements of a product’s package with source identification.12  
On the other hand, the Court states that consumers do not readily 
associate a product’s design with source identification.13 
 
 8 See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. 205. 
 9 Id. at 215 (reasoning that Two Pesos “unquestionably establishes the legal principle 
that trade dress can be inherently distinctive, but it does not establish that product-design 
trade dress can be.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 10 Id. (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773 (1992)). 
 11 Id. at 209.   
The breadth of the definition of marks registrable under § 2, and of 
the confusion-producing elements recited as actionable by § 43(a), 
has been held to embrace not just word marks, such as ‘Nike,’ and 
symbol marks, such as Nike’s ‘swoosh’ symbol, but also ‘trade 
dress’–a category that originally included only the packaging, or 
‘dressing,’ of a product, but in recent years has been expanded by 
many Courts of Appeals to encompass the design of a product. 
Id. (citations omitted); see Dorota Niechwiej Clegg, Note, Aesthetic Functionality 
Conundrum and Traderight: A Proposal for a Foster Home to an Orphan of Intellectual 
Property Laws, 89 IOWA L. REV. 273, 275 (2003) (“Trade dress is the conceptual progeny 
of trademarks.  It consists in the product’s image and the totality of appearance that the 
product presents to the consumer. Like trademarks, trade dress aims to distinguish the 
product’s source from those of other similar products on the market.”) (footnotes 
omitted).   
 12 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 212–13 (“Consumers are therefore predisposed to 
regard those symbols [i.e., word marks and product packaging] as indication of the 
producer, which is why such symbols ‘almost automatically tell a customer that they 
refer to a brand,’ and ‘immediately . . . signal a brand or a product ‘source.’’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 13 See id. at 213 (“It seems to us that design, like color, is not inherently distinctive.”); 
see also Olem Shoe Corp. v. Washington Shoe Co., 2010 WL 1370823, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
2010) (“Wal–Mart Stores held that a trade dress is protectible [sic] only on a showing of 
secondary meaning, because the design will invariably serve purposes other than source 
identification.”) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213, 216). 
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The Court cites no authority for its statements—factual 
conclusions—regarding consumer associations and how and 
whether, psychologically speaking, consumers react to a product’s 
design in a manner that is materially different from the ways that 
they react to product packaging.14  Absent empirical data, such as 
research or consumer surveys that demonstrate consumer 
psychological associations or reactions, it is remarkable that the 
Court was willing to unilaterally arrive at such a conclusion, 
especially when that conclusion is central to its holding. “It is a 
fact of life that thinking or talking about doing empirical research 
is much more fun than actually doing it.”15  The Court apparently 
engaged in armchair psychology in this instance.  Nevertheless, the 
Wal-Mart case establishes the rule of law that the design of a 
product must acquire a secondary meaning in order to operate as 
protectable trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.16  Justice 
Scalia offers an example of a cocktail shaker in the shape of a 
penguin.17  A penguin-shaped cocktail shaker—a product design—
would have to acquire a secondary meaning in order to be 
protectable as trade dress under § 43(a).18  Thus, assume that the 
Penguin Corporation begins selling a cocktail shaker in the shape 
of a penguin.  If the consuming public, or rather, an appreciable 
number of relevant consumers of cocktail shakers, comes to 
associate a penguin-shaped cocktail shaker as emanating from the 
 
 14 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213 (concluding that in the case of product 
designs, “consumer predisposition to equate the feature with the source does not exist,” 
but providing no citations of authority for that finding). 
 15 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (1977). 
 16 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 216; see E & J Gallo v. Proximo Spirits, Inc., 
2012 WL 273076, at *10 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 
216); Bonanza Press, Inc. v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 2010 WL 2196112, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 
2010) (“[A] trademark is protectable only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”) 
(citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 216 ); see also Clegg, supra note 11, at 287 
(“The Court [in Wal-Mart Stores] ruled that the unqualified protection of inherently 
distinctive trade dress applied only to product packaging trade dress features, namely, the 
physical characteristics of the vehicle in which the product is sold.”).  
 17 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213 (“In the case of product design, as in the case 
of color, we think consumer predisposition to equate the feature with the source does not 
exist. Consumers are aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual 
of product designs—such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin—is intended not to 
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more appealing.”).   
 18 Id. 
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Penguin Corporation (i.e., the source of penguin-shaped cocktail 
shakers), Justice Scalia’s reasoning suggests that the Penguin 
Corporation may own that trade dress and may prohibit others 
from selling penguin-shaped cocktail shakers that are confusingly 
similar.19 
Part I of this Article examines the Wal-Mart decision in light of 
the general principles of trade dress law that the Court established 
in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc.20 and Two Pesos, 
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,21 the two precedents that forged the 
Supreme Court’s general, pertinent doctrinal rules.  Part II 
considers these cases using the conceptual tools of utilitarian 
functionality and aesthetic functionality, and suggests that these 
perspectives, coupled with traditional trademark analysis, offer a 
more effective and efficient method of analysis than the Court’s 
approach in Wal-Mart.  Part III offers additional suggestions to 
improve the analysis in cases like Wal-Mart, explaining the 
similarities between the trademark doctrines of utilitarian 
functionality and aesthetic functionality and the copyright 
doctrines of conceptual separability and the idea-expression 
dichotomy.  The Conclusion briefly summarizes the Wal-Mart 
holding, the reasons why it is preferable to analyze Wal-Mart in 
terms of traditional trademark categories along with utilitarian and 
aesthetic functionality, and why using the analogies of copyright’s 
conceptual separability and idea-expression analyses can simplify 
and improve decision-making in cases involving issues like those 
presented in Wal-Mart.22 
 
 19 See id. at 212–13 (The Court explains that although product color or design is not 
inherently distinctive, a product’s design can be protected when customers come to treat 
the product as coming from a specific source.  Applying this reasoning, a hypothetical 
penguin-shape design for a cocktail shaker can be protectable only once the consumer 
public has associated that design with the specific source.).  
 20 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 21 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 22 See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 641–42 (emphasizing the importance of 
recognizing various cultural, social, and psychological factors that necessitate serious 
legal analysis in cases involving trademark protection for visual elements: “Information 
is transmitted, and meaning received, through the use of pictorial and spatial imagery 
rather than (or, at least, in addition to) the lexical form.”). 
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I. TWO PESOS, QUALITEX, & WAL-MART 
A. The Abercrombie Continuum 
In one of the most famous American trademark opinions, 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc.,23 Judge Friendly 
charted the course for the most fundamental, traditional principles 
of trademark analysis.  He explained that all putative trademarks 
exist on a continuum stretching from “generic” (weakest) to 
“fanciful” (strongest).24  In between those polar extremes lie points 
labeled “descriptive,” “suggestive,” and “arbitrary.”25  In order to 
determine whether any given putative mark may operate as a valid, 
legal trademark, one must determine where it lies on the 
Abercrombie continuum.26  In order to arrive at this determination, 
one must consider the relationship between the putative mark and 
the product that it represents.27  Assessing the cognitive link or 
mental association between those two–the putative mark and the 
product–forms the heart of the Abercrombie analysis.28  
Symbolism and abstract thinking are the essential keys to this 
inquiry.  Judge Motz of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
provided the following summary example: 
 
 23 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 24 Id. at 9; see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) 
(explaining the “classic formulation set out by Judge Friendly” in Abercrombie as a 
spectrum from “generic” to “fanciful”) (citation omitted).  
 25 See Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A., 187 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 
1999) (“A court applying the Abercrombie analysis asks whether the trademark in 
question is (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, or (5) fanciful.”) 
(citing Perini Corp. v. Perini Const., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990)).  To be sure, 
attaching meaning to these terms is not always easy.  Legal philosophers have recognized 
that defining terms has been one of the most difficult tasks of jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
JEROME HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1973) (“[O]rdinary words are used 
in a technical sense, and it requires a great deal of study, in effect a legal education, to 
understand how those terms are used.”).  
 26 See Ashley Furniture Indus., 187 F.3d at 369. 
 27 See id. (describing the  specific relationship that exists between a product and a 
mark for generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful trademarks, 
respectively). 
 28 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 11:64 (explaining that “[t]he 
distinctiveness of a mark cannot be determined in the abstract, but only by reference to 
the goods or services upon which the mark is used.”) (footnote omitted).  
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For example, the trade name “Pet Store” for a shop 
that sold pets would be generic.  The word 
“penguin,” by contrast, would be descriptive when 
used in the name of a shop that specialized in items 
relating to a certain polar species; suggestive when 
denominating an air conditioning company; and 
arbitrary when the name of a book publishing 
company.  (If the book publisher wanted a fanciful 
mark, it could use a made-up word, like 
“Penquell.”).29 
Putative marks that are generic can never operate as valid 
trademarks because, by definition, they are merely the common 
descriptive terms for products, and therefore cannot distinguish 
one producer’s products from another.  The word “apple” 
communicates a message to people who know enough English to 
know that the word “apple” symbolizes a specific kind of fruit.  
Thus, the word “apple” is generic as applied to that specific kind of 
fruit, and it, therefore, cannot operate as a valid trademark for that 
fruit.  This rule prohibiting trademark protection for generic 
symbols prevents any one producer from excluding competitors.  
Competitors must be allowed to use generic symbols to advertise.  
Otherwise consumers would be deprived of essential information 
needed to have market choices. 
At the opposite end of the continuum, “fanciful” marks are the 
strongest as trademarks.  Fanciful marks are, for example, words 
that someone has invented or made up (“coined”), such as Judge 
Motz’s hypothetical word “Penquell.”  Such words, because they 
have not previously existed in the social lexicon, are incapable of 
having any association with a product.  Some standard examples of 
fanciful marks are “KODAK” for photographic equipment and 
 
 29 Ashley Furniture Indus., 187 F.3d at 369; see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, 
supra note 4, at 11:71 (“For example, in the author’s opinion, the word ‘apple’ would be 
arbitrary when used on personal computers, suggestive when used in ‘Apple-A-Day’ on 
vitamin tablets, descriptive when used in ‘Tomapple’ for combination tomato-apple juice 
and generic when used on apples.”) (footnote omitted). 
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“VIAGRA” for the pharmaceutical product.30  Because fanciful 
words have no socio-linguistic history, they are the opposite of 
generic terms.31  Presumably, unlike generic words, there is 
absolutely no need for either competitors in advertising their goods 
or consumers in trolling the marketplace in search of goods to 
employ or have access to fanciful symbols. 
Working our way back along the continuum from strongest 
(“fanciful”) to weakest (“generic”), “arbitrary” marks are also 
relatively strong.32  Like fanciful marks, there is no logical, 
cognitive association between an “arbitrary” symbol and its 
product.33  But we generally categorize marks as “arbitrary” when 
the mark already existed in our lexicon (i.e., it was not coined or 
invented).34  Hence, the word “apple” used as a trademark for 
music products such as records, CDs, or MP3 files would be 
arbitrary since there is no logical connection between music and 
the standard meanings (e.g., typically a specific kind of fruit) 
associated with the word “apple.”35 
“Suggestive” marks are those that require a leap of imagination 
or a connecting-of-the-dots.36  As a rule we categorize a mark as 
“suggestive” if an ordinary consumer, upon learning the nature of 
the product, after having heard the trademark, would say 
something like “oh . . . hahaha . . . I get it.”  Perhaps on occasion a 
consumer might make a good guess and guess the nature of the 
goods after perceiving the suggestive stimulus.  Although post hoc 
appreciation of the association might be amusing, as a rule, courts 
say that the imagination test is the hallmark of a “suggestive” 
 
 30 See generally MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, §§ 11:8, 11:5 (“‘Fanciful’ 
marks consist of ‘coined’ words that have been invented or selected for the sole purpose 
of functioning as a trademark.”) (footnote omitted). 
 31 See id. § 11:5. 
 32 See id. § 11:14. 
 33 See id. § 11:11. 
 34 See id. (“Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols, pictures, etc., that are in 
common linguistic use but which, when used with the goods or services in issue, neither 
suggest nor describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of those goods or services.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See id. § 11:67. 
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mark.37  “ESKIMO PIE” for a kind of ice cream and Judge Motz’s 
hypothetical “PENGUIN” brand air conditioner are good examples 
of suggestive marks.38 
Lastly, “descriptive” marks present two unique analytical 
problems.  Courts commonly state that a putative mark is 
“descriptive” if it immediately relates the nature, contents, or 
characteristics of its associated product.39  For example, the phrase 
“two all-beef patties, special sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles, onions, 
on a sesame seed bun” immediately relates the contents of 
McDonald’s famous “Big Mac” hamburger.40  Hence, that phrase 
is descriptive.  One of the unique analytical problems related to 
descriptive marks is the problem of drawing a line between a 
putative mark that is “descriptive” versus a putative mark that is 
“generic.”41  The line is not always clear-cut, but it is an incredibly 
important line.42  It is incredibly important because, as has been 
explained, a putative mark that is deemed “generic” cannot operate 
as a valid trademark.43  On the other hand, a putative mark that is 
deemed “descriptive” may operate as a valid trademark.44  The 
catch is that, in order to operate as a valid trademark, a descriptive 
mark must first acquire a secondary meaning.45  Acquisition of 
secondary meaning is a precondition to being recognized as a valid 
trademark in the case of descriptive terms.46  The secondary 
meaning requirement for descriptive marks leads us to the second 
analytical problem; namely, drawing the line between 
 
 37 See id. (“The more imagination that is required on the potential customer’s part to 
get some direct description of the product from the designation, the more likely the 
designation is suggestive, not descriptive.”) (footnote omitted); id. § 11:66 (“The 
descriptive-suggestive borderline is hardly a clear one.  Its exact location in any give 
situation is hazy and only subjectively definable.”); Id. § 11:62 (“A distinction developed 
in the law whereby a mark which merely suggested some quality or ingredient of goods 
was labeled [sic] as ‘suggestive, distinguishing it from descriptive marks.”). 
 38 See id. § 14:7; see also Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A., 187 F.3d 
363, 369 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 39 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 11:16. 
 40 See id. § 7:22 n.18. 
 41 See id. § 12:20. 
 42 See id. § 11:66. 
 43 See id. § 12:2. 
 44 See id. § 11:25. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. 15.2 
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“descriptive” versus “suggestive.”47  The Abercrombie rubric 
categorizes fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks as “inherently 
distinctive.”48  By definition, inherently distinctive marks are 
capable of distinguishing the mark owner’s products without 
secondary meaning (i.e., inherently).49  On the other hand, 
descriptive marks are the only Abercrombie category that requires 
proof of secondary meaning as a condition precedent to receiving 
trademark protection.50  Thus, if a putative mark is deemed merely 
“suggestive” as it relates to its product, it automatically may serve 
as a valid trademark.51  But if, on the other hand, a putative mark is 
deemed “descriptive,” it must acquire secondary meaning before it 
may operate as a valid trademark.52 
B. Two Pesos (Trade Dress) & Qualitex (Colors) 
Prior to its decision in Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court, in two 
landmark cases, had established two fundamental rules regarding 
the relationship between trade dress and secondary meaning.53  In 
1992, Justice White’s opinion in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 
Inc. held that trade dress was protectable under § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act even if the trade dress had not first acquired a 
secondary meaning.54  In simple terms, Justice White reasoned 
that, like traditional word trademarks, trade dress, protected under 
 
 47 See id. § 11:26. 
 48 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (“The latter 
three categories of marks, because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular 
source of a product, are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection.”); 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 49 See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768–69; Thoip v. Walt Disney Co., 736 F. Supp. 2d 
689, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 50 See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769. 
 51 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 11:2. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. §§ 8:8, 8:12.5. 
 54 See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 767 (“We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict 
among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether trade dress that is inherently 
distinctive is protectible [sic] under § 43(a) without a showing that it has acquired 
secondary meaning . . . . We find that it is, and we therefore affirm.”) (footnote omitted) 
(citation omitted); see also Clegg, supra note 11, at 286 (citing Two Pesos for the 
proposition that trade dress may be inherently distinctive). 
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§ 43(a), ought to be analyzed using the Abercrombie rubric.55  
Justice White’s opinion logically concludes that trade dress, at 
least conceptually, ought to be analyzed in the same manner.56  
Justice White explained: 
Where secondary meaning does appear in the 
statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982 ed.), it is a 
requirement that applies only to merely descriptive 
marks and not to inherently distinctive ones.  We 
see no basis for requiring secondary meaning for 
inherently distinctive trade dress protection under § 
43(a) but not for other distinctive words, symbols, 
or devices capable of identifying a producer’s 
product.57 
Thus, Two Pesos established the rule that fanciful, arbitrary, or 
suggestive trade dress operates as a protectable trademark without 
proof of secondary meaning. 
In 1995, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Qualitex held that color 
may operate as a trademark.58  In short, the Court reasoned that 
color easily fits within the statutory subject matter in the Lanham 
Act’s definition of a trademark: “any word, name, symbol, or 
 
 55 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770 (“There is no persuasive reason to apply to trade 
dress a general requirement of secondary meaning which is at odds with the principles 
generally applicable to infringement suits under § 43(a).”); see also Vanessa Bowman 
Pierce, If it Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck, Shouldn’t it Be a Duck?; How a 
“Functional” Approach Ameliorates the Discontinuity Between the “Primary 
Significance” Tests for Genericness and Secondary Meaning, 37 N.M. L. REV. 147 
(2007) (noting the difficulties that courts encounter when trying to categorize marks).  
 56 See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 772. 
If a verbal or symbolic mark or the features of a product design may 
be registered under § 2, it necessarily is a mark “by which the goods 
of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others,” 60 
Stat. 428, and must be registered unless otherwise disqualified. Since 
§ 2 requires secondary meaning only as a condition to registering 
descriptive marks, there are plainly marks that are registrable without 
showing secondary meaning.  
Id. 
 57 Id. at 774. 
 58 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995) (“We 
conclude that, sometimes, a color will meet the ordinary legal trademark requirements. 
And, when it does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone from serving as a 
trademark.”); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, §§ 7:39, 7:44.  
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device . . . .”59  This case put to rest the debate regarding the 
protectability of colors as trademarks that had raged for decades.60  
One of the most interesting aspects of Qualitex, however, is that 
the Court’s holding is not, in reality, so simple.  The “wrinkle” in 
the case is that Qualitex’s green-gold color had, as a matter of fact, 
acquired a secondary meaning.61  The Court’s opinion does not 
clearly explain precisely how and/or when that determination was 
made.  But the Ninth Circuit’s opinion below explicitly noted that 
the District Court, the original fact-finder, had expressly found that 
Qualitex’s unique green-gold color had acquired a secondary 
meaning.  As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: 
The evidence showed: Qualitex has sold its “SUN 
GLOW” press pad with a green-gold color for over 
30 years.  The company has spent over $1.6 million 
in advertising and promoting its press pads in 
magazines and at trade shows, and nearly all 
advertising and promotion have highlighted the 
green-gold color of the pad.  Qualitex has run 
advertisements featuring the press pad’s green-gold 
color on a monthly basis for the last 30 years in a 
 
 59 See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162.  
Both the language of the Act and the basic underlying principles of 
trademark law would seem to include color within the universe of 
things that can qualify as a trademark. The language of the Lanham 
Act describes that universe in the broadest terms. It says that 
trademarks “include[e] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof.” § 1127. Since human beings might use as a 
‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost anything at all that is capable of carrying 
meaning, this language, read literally, is not restrictive. 
Id. 
 60 See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 161 (“The Courts of Appeals have differed as to 
whether or not the law recognizes the use of color alone as a trademark.”) (citations 
omitted).  Professor Bartow has vigorously argued that the decision was wrongly decided. 
See Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti 
Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263 (2008–09) (“The Supreme Court was wrong to 
facilitate this abuse of trademark powers when it decided in Qualitex v. Jacobson 
Products Co. that colors alone could constitute protectable trademarks.”) (citation 
omitted); id. at 271 (“It is the position of this author that the Qualitex case was wrongly 
decided. It is endemically problematic because the opinion resulted in de facto 
lawmaking that expanded the scope of trademark law without adequately considering the 
competitive functional roles that product design features, like color, play.”). 
 61 See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 166. 
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leading magazine aimed at the dry cleaner market.  
There was evidence that readers of a trade 
publication associated the green-gold color with 
Qualitex.62 
Thus, the Supreme Court accepted that the green-gold color 
had acquired a secondary meaning.63  There are several sentences 
in the Qualitex opinion itself that suggest that the Court intended to 
hold that color alone may operate as a protectable trademark if, 
and only if, the color has first acquired a secondary meaning.  And, 
in fact, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Wal-Mart interprets Qualitex in 
this manner.64  For example the Qualitex Court stated: “But, over 
time customers may come to treat a particular color on a product or 
its packaging (say, a color that in context seems unusual, such as 
pink on a firm’s insulating material or red on the head of a large 
industrial bolt) as signifying a brand.”65 
[O]ne might ask, if trademark law permits a 
descriptive word with secondary meaning to act as a 
mark, why would it not permit color, under similar 
circumstances, to do the same? 
       We cannot find in the basic objectives of 
trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to 
the use of color alone as a trademark, where that 
color has attained “secondary meaning” and 
therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular 
brand (and thus indicates its “source”).66 
 
 62 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 13 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994); see 
Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1247 (D. Colo. 
2009) (discussing In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 Fed. 2d. 1116, 1122 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985)); Mitchell M. Wong, Note, The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law 
of Trade-Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1137 (1998) (discussing In re 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 Fed. 2d. 1116, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and noting 
“the Federal Circuit held that the color pink, when applied to insulation, was not 
functional because there was no benefit to be derived from the use of that color.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 63 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
 64 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (“Indeed, 
with respect to at least one category of mark—colors—we have held that no mark can 
ever be inherently distinctive.”) (citing Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162–63). 
 65 Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163. 
 66 Id. 
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But it is worthwhile to note that there are other sentences in the 
opinion that do not necessarily convey this same restrictive 
viewpoint.  For example: “We conclude that, sometimes, a color 
will meet ordinary legal trademark requirements.  And, when it 
does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone from serving as 
a trademark.”67  “We hold now that there is no rule absolutely 
barring the use of color alone . . . .”68  Thus, to the extent that 
Justice Breyer actually intended to impose a requirement of 
secondary meaning for colors to operate as protectable trademarks, 
the opinion created new law in more ways than one.  The obvious 
new law was that colors now could operate as protectable 
trademarks.  But the less obvious law was that color trademarks, 
like descriptive marks, were henceforth subject to the same 
requirement regarding proof of secondary meaning.  In this regard, 
Qualitex flies squarely in the face of Justice White’s statements in 
Two Pesos, wherein he expressed reticence and caution about 
imposing a secondary meaning requirement on putative trademarks 
other than descriptive marks.69  Justice Scalia’s opinion in Wal-
Mart adopts this restrictive interpretation of Qualitex, and uses it 
as a fulcrum upon which to justify the Court’s decision to impose 
 
 67 Id. at 161. 
 68 Id. at 162.  Professor McCarthy notes this ambiguity in Qualitex regarding whether 
secondary meaning ought to be a precondition for colors to serve as valid trademarks, and 
discusses pre-Wal-Mart cases that had split on this very issue.  Professor McCarthy 
expresses the opinion that the Wal-Mart interpretation is the correct one. See MCCARTHY 
ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:44. 
 69 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 770 (1992) (“There is no 
persuasive reason to apply to trade dress a general requirement of secondary meaning 
which is at odds with the principles generally applicable to infringement suits under § 
43(a).”). 
 Where secondary meaning does appear in the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 
1052 (1982 ed.), it is a requirement that applies only to merely 
descriptive marks and not to inherently distinctive ones. We see no 
basis for requiring secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade 
dress protection under § 43(a) but not for other distinctive words, 
symbols, or devices capable of identifying a producer’s product. 
Id. at 774; see also Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 
2009) (discussing the requirement of secondary meaning).  Legal philosophers have 
suggested that judicial consistency is important. See, e.g., JEROME HALL, FOUNDATIONS 
OF JURISPRUDENCE 68 (1973) (“Since it is highly improbable that he [i.e., Kelsen] means 
to assert that judges are always consistent, his theory is ethically normative in implying 
that judges should be consistent.”).  
C03_VERSTEEG (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2013  1:00 PM 
1264 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1249 
the exact same secondary meaning requirement on product 
designs.70 
C. Wal-Mart (Product Design) 
In Wal-Mart, the products at issue were children’s clothing 
with a variety of child-friendly motifs, such as rainbows, unicorns, 
trains, friendly bears, and the like.  The Court ruled that because 
Samara Brothers’ clothing designs had not acquired a secondary 
meaning, the designs were not protectable under § 43(a).71  The 
Court distinguished the Taco Cabana restaurant décor that had 
been at issue in Two Pesos, saying that the restaurant décor was 
either more equivalent to product packaging or, perhaps, some 
additional subcategory (the Court resorts to the Latin phrase 
“tertium quid”—some third kind of thing) that perhaps does not fit 
neatly into the designation of either product packaging or product 
design.72  In Two Pesos, the Court had concluded that a 
restaurant’s décor could be protectable trade dress “based on a 
finding of inherent distinctiveness, without proof that the trade 
dress ha[d] secondary meaning.”73 
 
 70 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (“Indeed, with 
respect to at least one category of mark—colors—we have held that no mark can ever be 
inherently distinctive.”) (citation omitted); see id. at 212 (“We held that a color could be 
protected as a trademark, but only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”); see also 
Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1246 (D. Colo. 
2009). 
 71 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 216 (“We hold that, in an action for infringement 
of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is 
distinctive, and therefore protectible [sic], only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”).  
 72 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 215. 
Two Pesos is inapposite to our holding here because the trade dress at 
issue, the decor of a restaurant, seems to us not to constitute product 
design. It was either product packaging—which, as we have 
discussed, normally is taken by the consumer to indicate origin—or 
else some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has no 
bearing on the present case. 
Id. 
 73 Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 764–65 (“The issue in this case is whether the trade 
dress of a restaurant may be protected under § 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 
(Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 441, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 1982 ed.), based on a finding of inherent 
distinctiveness, without proof that the trade dress has secondary meaning.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Thus, the Wal-Mart Court established the rule that not all 
things that can be characterized as trade dress may be inherently 
distinctive.  The Court concedes that some trade dress, such as 
product packaging and the Taco Cabana restaurant décor, may be 
protectable as trade dress without a showing of secondary meaning 
(i.e., those types of trade dress may be inherently distinctive as 
fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive).74  Nevertheless, the Wal-Mart 
Court also established that trade dress that falls within the 
subcategory of product design may only be protectable under § 
43(a) upon proof that the design has acquired a secondary 
meaning.75  The Wal-Mart Court, as was mentioned,76 draws an 
analogy to the use of colors as trademarks.  The Court cites the 
Qualitex decision for the proposition that colors may serve as 
trademarks but only upon proof that the color in question has first 
acquired a secondary meaning.77  In Qualitex, as was noted, the 
Court accepted that Qualitex’s green-gold color had acquired a 
secondary meaning among consumers of dry cleaning press pads.78  
The Court stated: “Having developed secondary meaning (for 
customers identified the green-gold [press pad] color as 
Qualitex’s), it identifies the press pads’ source.”79  In Wal-Mart, 
the Court actually explained its rule regarding product design (i.e., 
its rule that proof of a secondary meaning is a condition precedent 
to trade dress protection of a product design under § 43(a)), by 
drawing an analogy between colors and product designs.80  The 
Court stated that consumers are not inclined to equate colors with 
source indication nor are consumers inclined to equate product 
design with source indication.81 
 
 74 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 215. 
 75 See id. at 216; see also Clegg, supra note 11, at 287–88 (“Thus, current standards 
for determining the trade dress’s distinctiveness hinge upon its classification as product 
packaging or product design.”) (footnote omitted).  
 76 See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 77 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 212. 
 78 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995); see also 
supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
 79 Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 166. 
 80 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213. 
 81 Id.  
In the case of product design, as in the case of color, we think 
consumer predisposition to equate the feature with the source does 
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Thus, the Court has carved out two significant exceptions to 
the traditional tenets of trademark law.  Traditional trademark law, 
as explained by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie, recognizes that 
putative trademarks may be analyzed in terms of “strength” or 
“distinctiveness.”82  In fact, the Two Pesos decision discusses 
Judge Friendly’s analysis in Abercrombie, and explicitly relies on 
it.83  The Abercrombie case, as was mentioned, made it clear that 
only descriptive marks need a showing of secondary meaning in 
order to be protectable.84  As was suggested, if the Qualitex Court 
had in fact intended to impose a per se secondary meaning 
requirement for colors, the opinion certainly could have been more 
direct and clear.85  Nevertheless, the Wal-Mart Court, as is their 
prerogative, refines or interprets the Qualitex holding in precisely 
this way.86 
D. Colors, Other Non-Word Marks, & the Abercrombie 
Continuum: Additional Considerations 
But there is certainly a case to be made for the proposition that 
colors, like other types of trademarks—words, names, symbols, or 
devices, or combinations thereof—ought not be subject to a 
secondary meaning requirement.  Rather they ought to be analyzed 
using the traditional Abercrombie analysis in the same manner that 
Justice White suggested for trade dress, in general, in Two Pesos.87  
 
not exist. Consumers are aware of the reality that, almost invariably, 
even the most unusual of product designs—such as a cocktail shaker 
shaped like a penguin—is intended not to identify the source, but to 
render the product itself more useful or more appealing. 
Id. 
 82 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); see 
supra text accompanying notes 16–24. 
 83 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773 (1992); see Amazing 
Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 665 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (S.D. Tex. 2009) 
(explaining genericity and the Abercrombie categories).  This was affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded in Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 
225 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Clegg, supra note 11, at 285–88 (discussing the 
Abercrombie spectrum of distinctiveness). 
 84 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 8; see supra note 45. 
 85 See supra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
 86 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 211 (“Indeed, with respect to at least one 
category of mark-colors-we have held that no mark can ever be inherently distinctive.”).  
 87 Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 773. 
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At this point it is sufficient to suggest one simple example.  The 
color green, like any symbol, may be arbitrary, suggestive, 
descriptive, or generic, depending on the product with which a 
putative trademark owner wishes to use it.88  Using the 
Abercrombie rubric, we might conclude that green would be 
arbitrary as a color mark for hammers, suggestive for a website 
devoted to the psychological effects of envy, descriptive (or 
probably even generic) for mint-flavored foods, and generic for the 
sale of green paint.89  The Abercrombie analysis relies on cognitive 
 
The Fifth Circuit was quite right in Chevron, and in this case, to 
follow the Abercrombie classifications consistently and to inquire 
whether trade dress for which protection is claimed under § 43(a) is 
inherently distinctive. If it is, it is capable of identifying products or 
services as coming from a specific source and secondary meaning is 
not required. This is the rule generally applicable to trademarks, and 
the protection of trademarks and trade dress under § 43(a) serves the 
same statutory purpose of preventing deception and unfair 
competition. There is no persuasive reason to apply different analysis 
to the two. The “proposition that secondary meaning must be shown 
even if the trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark, [is] wrong, 
for the reasons explained by Judge Rubin for the Fifth Circuit in 
Chevron.”  
Id. (citing Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (CA7 1986)).  
Professor Dinwoodie refers to the approach of treating words and symbols as equals for 
purposes of trademark analysis an “assimilationist model,” and he refers to the type of 
analysis that the Wal-Mart court later used (i.e., analyzing putative trademarks based on 
subject matter) as a “categorical model.”  See Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 656, 663. 
 88 For purposes of this discussion, I assume that the variety of shades of green that has 
been used by someone at some time, although theoretically infinite, renders it unlikely 
that there could be a shade that would be considered “fanciful.”  
 89 See Bartow, supra note 60, at 285.  
The Hershey Company’s use of brown in the wrapper of its famous 
Hershey Bar, and in the packaging of so many of its other products, 
communicates chocolate. Color can also communicate messages 
other than product ingredients per se. Continuing in the context of 
candy, the color red is associated with certain flavors: strawberry and 
cherry, which are as red as the fruits are when ripened on the tree or 
vine, and cinnamon, which is a far duller brown in its natural state. 
Red can also signal peppermint, such as in a traditional striped candy 
cane, even though the peppermint leaves from which the flavor is 
derived are bright green. Wintergreen flavored Lifesaver candies, 
however, are white. Colors provide information the consumers want 
(green candies are unlikely to be orange or cherry flavored) even if it 
is imperfect or incomplete (green candies may be spearmint flavored, 
or the color may denote lime). The interference with this 
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association.90  The stronger the public’s cognitive association is 
between any given symbol and a product or service, the weaker 
that symbol is in terms of trademark strength.  That is why generic 
words cannot operate as valid trademarks.  The public’s cognitive 
association between a generic word and the product is so strongly 
linked that, upon hearing or seeing the generic word, the public 
automatically associates that word with a specific product or 
service.91  Because anyone who sells products and services ought 
to be entitled to use generic words in order to advertise, trademark 
law prohibits any one seller from gaining exclusive control over 
generic words.  In the case of descriptive words, the same general 
reasoning applies.  Although the line between generic words versus 
descriptive words is not always clear, unlike generic words that 
can never operate as trademarks, descriptive words may operate as 
trademarks if the putative trademark owner can prove that the 
descriptive word has acquired a secondary meaning.  The drafters 
of Lanham Act established the rule that descriptive words could 
only operate as trademarks if the public had acquired a new 
cognitive association that linked the descriptive word with a 
particular producer (i.e., a secondary meaning), in addition to the 
ordinary cognitive association that it (i.e., the public) previously 
had between the descriptive word and the product or service (i.e., 
the primary meaning).92 
 
communication that can be caused by color-alone trademarks is one 
more argument against having them. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:52 (“Color as 
generic or descriptive indication”).  Presumably there could be instances where a color 
also could be “deceptively misdescriptive.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e) (2006) (e.g., brown-
colored milk that is actually strawberry-flavored rather than chocolate-flavored). 
 90 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9 (explaining that terms may switch from one 
category to another over time, based on the way that certain people use and understand it 
via their cognitive association). 
 91 See Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 633 (“The grant of trademark rights in a verbal 
mark typically does not make it significantly more difficult for a competitor to produce a 
rival product; restricting the words by which the competitor may identify its product does 
not limit the ways in which the competitor may design its product.”). 
 92 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 15:5 (“The prime element of 
secondary meaning is a mental association in buyers’ minds between the alleged mark 
and a single source of the product.”). 
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Presumably, once we understand how the Abercrombie 
analysis applies to words, we can also apply the analysis to other 
kinds of trademarks such as names, symbols, devices, and 
combinations thereof; and presumably even colors.  Although the 
analysis may be more challenging to apply to non-word marks, as 
Justice White stated in Two Pesos, it makes perfect sense to do 
so.93  Colors, sounds, scents, and trade dress such as product 
packaging and product designs are all means by which a producer 
may communicate to the public that a particular product emanates 
from that particular producer.94  That is really what makes a 
trademark a trademark.  A trademark is a message from the 
producer to the public: “I made this product!”95  If the message that 
the public perceives is something else, especially something about 
the content, quality, or innate nature of the product, such as “this 
product is mint-flavored,” “this product is green paint,” or “this is 
Baroque-style silverware,” then the symbol cannot automatically 
operate as a trademark.  Descriptors can only operate as 
trademarks upon proof of secondary meaning and generic terms 
can never operate as trademarks.  This principle is true whether the 
putative mark is a word, name, symbol or device. 
E. Ashley Furniture: The Road Not Taken 
In 1999, Judge Motz of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
wrote a well-reasoned opinion in Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. 
v. Sangiacomo N.A., applying the Abercrombie analysis to a 
 
 93 See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 773 (“There is no persuasive reason to apply 
different analysis to the two. The ‘proposition that secondary meaning must be shown 
even if the trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark, [is] wrong, for the reasons 
explained by Judge Rubin for the Fifth Circuit in Chevron.’”) (quoting Blau Plumbing, 
Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix–It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 94 See Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 618 (noting that the Supreme Court is “willing to 
recognize that packaging, design features, colors, sounds and even smells can also 
accomplish that role.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 621 (“Consumers clearly identified the 
carbonated soft drink produced by the Coca-Cola Company as much from the shape of 
the bottle in which it was contained as by the word COKE  emblazoned on the side of 
the bottle.”) (footnote omitted); see also Bartow, supra note 60, at 265–66 (discussing the 
pros and cons of non-linguistic marks, such as sounds and scents). 
 95 See Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 653 (“[T]rademark law concerns the meaning of 
symbols to consumers.”) (footnote omitted). 
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product design.96  Judge Motz recounted the Abercrombie 
analysis,97 and then explained that Two Pesos dictated that this 
same approach ought to apply to product configurations. 
For two decades, the Abercrombie analysis has 
guided litigants and courts in determining “inherent 
distinctiveness” in trademark cases.  In 1992, the 
Supreme Court in Two Pesos described 
Abercrombie as the “classic formulation” of 
inherent distinctiveness.  Moreover, the Two Pesos 
Court held that the court of appeals had been “quite 
right” in “follow[ing] the Abercrombie 
classifications consistently” to determine “whether 
trade dress for which protection is claimed under § 
43(a) is inherently distinctive.”98 
She also explained why this approach was logical.99  In short, 
Judge Motz recognized what Justice Scalia in Wal-Mart did not.100  
 
 96 187 F.3d 363, 373 (4th Cir. 1999).   
 97 Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 369 (“In 1976, Judge Friendly articulated 
a methodology in Abercrombie that has been cited, quoted, and applied in numerous 
subsequent trademark cases to determine inherent distinctiveness.  A court applying the 
Abercrombie analysis asks whether the trademark in question is (1) generic, (2) 
descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, or (5) fanciful.”) (citations omitted). 
 98 Id. at 370; see also id. at 371 (“In sum, we hold that the Abercrombie categories, as 
Two Pesos suggests, provide the appropriate basic framework for deciding inherent 
distinctiveness in product configuration cases.”).  
 99 Id. at 370. 
Furthermore, contrary to suggestions made by courts that would limit the application of 
Abercrombie, it is not inherently impossible, illogical, or anomalous to apply the 
Abercrombie categories to product configuration.  The configuration of a banana-flavored 
candy, for example, would be generic if the candy were round, descriptive if it were 
shaped like a banana, suggestive if it were shaped like a monkey, arbitrary if it were 
shaped like a trombone, and fanciful if it were formed into some hitherto unknown shape. 
Id. (citations omitted); see Russ VerSteeg, Iguanas, Toads and Toothbrushes: Land-Use 
Regulation of Art as Signage, 25 GA. L. REV. 437, 472–75 (1991) (discussing the 
possibility of applying the Abercrombie rubric to three-dimensional sculpture (i.e., works 
of art), to show that such abstract thinking as it relates to symbolism for purposes of 
trademark analysis can be useful).  Judge Motz’s views expressed in Ashley Furniture 
appear consistent with this view. See Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 371. 
 100 See Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 375 (noting that a feature does not 
have to be purely source designating or aesthetic, but rather can serve both functions).  
Contra Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (finding 
product design to be “utilitarian and esthetic” rather source-designating). 
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There is no need to create artificial rules dependent on the 
classification of a putative mark as product configuration as 
opposed to product packaging, or any other category of word, 
name, symbol, or device.101  The Fourth Circuit frankly stated: “the 
creation of a new rule to be applied only to product configuration 
would comport neither with the language of the statute nor with the 
[Supreme] Court’s preference for uniformity.”102  The 
Abercrombie continuum provides the basic tools necessary, and the 
functionality doctrine provides a safety net to ensure that neither 
the utilitarian nor aesthetic features of a product’s configuration 
are protected as trademarks or trade dress.103 
In Ashley Furniture, the court examined the potential 
protectability of one of Ashley’s furniture suite designs (the 
“Sommerset Suite”).104  Judge Motz candidly acknowledged that 
the district court below had been faced with a challenge: 
In its careful opinion, the district court properly 
recognized that courts have differed as to how to 
determine inherent distinctiveness where, as here, 
the trade dress at issue is the product’s 
configuration or design rather than its packaging.  
This question has bedeviled courts because 
determining inherent distinctiveness typically 
requires verbalizing a judgment about the visual 
character of the product.105 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court was 
wrong to have granted summary judgment on the basis that Ashley 
had not presented sufficient evidence regarding whether its design 
was inherently distinctive.106  Using the Abercrombie continuum as 
 
 101 Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 371. 
 102 Id.; see MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 8:5 (regarding product shapes 
as protectable trade dress in general).  
 103 Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 375 (“The rule that a product feature is 
unprotectable if it is functional, however, fully safeguards competitors from the danger 
that a producer will, through trade dress law, obtain a monopoly over a useful product 
feature when the alternatives are limited.”) (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 
505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992)).  For more discussion regarding functionality see infra Part II. 
 104 Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 367–68. 
 105 Id. at 369. 
 106 Id. at 368. 
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its basis for analysis, the court held that it was possible for a jury to 
conclude that the design in question was either arbitrary or 
fanciful.107  Judge Motz relied on Two Pesos as authority for the 
court’s approach (i.e., applying the Abercrombie continuum to 
product design), and explained that the doctrine of functionality 
(both utilitarian and aesthetic) would serve as a safeguard.108 
Of particular additional importance, the opinion also explains 
how Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd. lends additional 
aid in evaluating whether a product configuration may be 
protectable as valid trade dress.109  In Seabrook, the court 
established that many visual images and symbols are simply so 
commonplace that they fail to operate as valid trademarks because 
consumers perceive such symbols, not as source identifiers, but 
rather as perfunctory geometric shapes that are not protectable by 
trademark law.110  Arguably, such trite symbols are either generic 
 
 107 Id. at 374. 
[T]he evidence here supports a possible finding that the Sommerset’s 
total overall image was arbitrary or fanciful and therefore inherently 
distinctive.  A factfinder could reasonably conclude that the total 
image created by the Sommerset’s neo-Roman design has no more to 
do with bedroom furniture than a penguin does with a publishing 
company. 
Id. 
 108 Id. at 375–76. 
 109 Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977).  
The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Seabrook as creating a test that is distinct from 
Abercrombie, whereas the Fourth Circuit in Ashley Furniture interprets Seabrook as 
establishing an analysis that may be used in conjunction with Abercrombie.  Compare 
Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 243 (5th Cir. 2010), with 
Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 371 (finding Seabrook to be an “elaboration of 
Abercrombie”). 
 110 Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 187 F.3d at 371.  
 The Seabrook court explained that in determining inherent 
distinctiveness a court looks to whether the alleged trade dress is “a 
‘common’ basic shape or design,” “unique or unusual in a particular 
field,” or “a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-
known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed 
by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods.”  Seabrook 
makes plain that a product’s overall design cannot be found 
inherently distinctive if it constitutes a “well-known” or “common” 
design, even if that design had not before been “refine[d]” in 
precisely the same way.  Rather, to qualify as inherently distinctive a 
design must be “unique or unusual” in the “particular field” at issue. 
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or aesthetically functional.111  Judge Motz cited Seabrook for the 
proposition that many such ordinary symbols would be excluded 
from trademark protection as generic.112  To be sure, the 
functionality doctrine will preclude many such putative marks.113  
The court noted: “Because the functionality requirement 
adequately safeguards the competitive use of aesthetic features, we 
see no reason for altering the inherent distinctiveness doctrine to 
limit protection of such features.”114  And, although Judge Motz 
acknowledged that applying the Abercrombie analysis poses 
challenges for non-verbal marks, she explained that the analysis is, 
nevertheless, both workable and appropriate.115 
Of course it is possible that a fact-finder could conclude that 
the eye-appeal of the Sommerset Suite design was the principal 
 
Id. (quoting Seabrook, 568 F.2d at 1344); see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra 
note 4, § 7:33 (“Ordinary geometric shapes such as circles, ovals, squares, etc., even 
when not used as a background for other marks, are regarded as nondistinctive and 
protectable only upon proof of secondary meaning.”). 
 111 See infra Part II. E., regarding the close relationship between genericity and 
functionality. 
 112 Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 371. 
 113 Id. (“[W]e think it likely that, by and large, the crucial question in product 
configuration cases will be the question that Seabrook helps answer: whether an alleged 
trade dress can be considered arbitrary or fanciful or whether it must be ruled generic.”).  
 114 Id. at 376. 
 115 Id. at 370. 
This is not to say that the Abercrombie analysis may not be difficult 
to apply in some product configuration cases.  But the contention that 
we should therefore refuse to apply it at all in such cases is, as the 
Supreme Court remarked with respect to another thorny Lanham Act 
issue, “unpersuasive . . . because it relies on an occasional problem to 
justify a blanket prohibition.” 
Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168 (1995)).  To a certain 
degree, Judge Motz’s opinion evinces a preference for applying a general theory of 
trademark law rather than subdividing the analysis on the basis of classifications of 
trademark subject matter (i.e., product packaging versus product configuration).  In this 
regard, the opinion may be characterized as “Landellian.”  See GILMORE, supra note 15, 
at 43 (“The Langdellians sought, with considerable success, to formulate theories which 
would cover broad areas of the common law and reduce an unruly diversity to a 
manageable unity.”).  For a case that takes a completely opposite view, see Amazing 
Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2010).  In Amazing Spaces, 
the Fifth Circuit rejected using the Abercrombie rubric for non-word marks, and 
wholeheartedly embraced the Wal-Mart tripartite analysis. Id. at 240.  Although the 
ultimate conclusions are not at odds with the analysis suggested in this Article, the 
reasoning employed is 180 degrees in the opposite direction.    
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consumer motivation.  If so, like the Baroque design discussed 
below in Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger 
Silver Art Co. and the children’s clothing designs in Wal-Mart, the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine might, indeed, serve as a 
gatekeeper to prevent the suite design from receiving trade dress 
protection.116  But Judge Motz’s recognition that there is no need 
to establish a rule isolating product designs for special treatment 
deserves serious consideration.117  The approach of Judge Motz 
and the Fourth Circuit in Ashley Furniture offers a more reasoned 
approach than that of Justice Scalia and the Supreme Court in Wal-
Mart. 
II. UTILITARIAN FUNCTIONALITY & AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY 
MAKE THE WAL-MART TRIPARTITE ANALYSIS UNNECESSARY 
A. Overview 
Part I of this Article explained that, by the time that the Wal-
Mart dust had settled, trademark law was changed.  Justice Scalia’s 
opinion created new doctrine.118  In the wake of Wal-Mart, three 
categories of putative trademarks are now protectable only upon 
proof of a secondary meaning: 1) descriptive marks; 2) colors; and 
3) product designs.119  This “Wal-Mart tripartite analysis” teaches 
that when faced with a putative trademark that is descriptive, a 
color, or a product design, a decision-maker must refuse trademark 
protection unless the descriptive mark, color, or product design has 
 
 116 See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc., v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F. 2d. 76, 81 
(2d Cir. 1990); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 
(2000); infra Part II. C. for further discussion. 
 117 Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 187 F.3d at 371. 
 118 Clegg, supra note 11, at 287 (“[The Court] scaled back the protection of trade dress . 
. . [and] ruled that the unqualified protection of inherently distinctive trade dress applied 
only to product packagingtrade dress features, namely, the physical characteristics of the 
vehicle in which the product is sold.”).  But see Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 702 (“The 
last thing that trademark law needs is more doctrine.”) (footnote omitted); GILMORE, 
supra note 15, at 111 (“The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an 
unjust law.  The worse the society, the more law there will be.  In Hell there will be 
nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.”). 
 119 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 212. 
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acquired a secondary meaning.120  Part II suggests that requiring 
proof of secondary meaning for colors and product designs is 
unnecessary and antithetical to the general rules and goals of 
trademarks.  Rather, against a backdrop of the traditional 
Abercrombie analysis, the doctrines of utilitarian functionality and 
aesthetic functionality provide better analytical tools to use when 
determining whether a color or a product design ought to operate 
as a trademark.121  Professor Dinwoodie has also argued that 
applying a functionality analysis is preferable to making decisions 
based on classifications of subject matter: “A candid 
acknowledgement of the real calculus being performed in 
functionality analysis might bring some transparency to trademark 
litigation, and reduce purported reliance on increasingly obtuse 
doctrinal distinctions and tests that consume the attention of 
litigants and courts to no great effect on the outcome of a case.”122  
Relying on functionality provides an easier method of decision-
making, and will strengthen the public domain better than the Wal-
Mart tripartite analysis.123 
B. Utilitarian Functionality 
It is black letter law that elements or components of a putative 
trademark or trade dress that are functional in a utilitarian sense 
cannot operate as a valid trademark or valid trade dress.124  The 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition articulates the doctrine: 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Others have recognized the importance of functionality in modern trademark law. 
See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 617–18 (“[T]rademark protection should depend 
upon whether the particular symbolic matter identifies the source of a product (i.e., 
whether the matter is ‘distinctive’), and upon whether protection of the particular symbol 
would accord the producer a practical monopoly and prevent effective competition by 
others (i.e., whether the matter is ‘functional’).”); see also id. at 699–701 (advocating “a 
unitary test of functionality” that does not necessarily separate utilitarian functionality 
from aesthetic functionality).  This article takes a similar philosophical position, 
nevertheless, it addresses and discusses these two aspects of functionality in separate 
sections.  
 122 Id. at 702. 
 123 Id. at 703. 
 124 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995) (“The 
functionality doctrine . . . forbids the use of a product’s feature as a trademark where 
doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature is 
‘essential to the use or purpose of the article’ or ‘affects [its] cost or quality.’”) (quoting 
C03_VERSTEEG (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2013  1:00 PM 
1276 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1249 
A design is “functional” . . . if the design affords 
benefits in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of 
the goods or services with which the design is used, 
apart from any benefits attributable to the design’s 
significance as an indication of source . . . that are 
not practically available through the use of 
alternative designs.125 
One of the principal reasons for this bedrock rule is that 
functional elements or components must be protected in American 
law, if at all, by a utility patent not by trademark law.  Judge 
Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit has explained the rationale 
succinctly: “functionality . . . seeks to protect the integrity of the 
utility patent system by excepting from configuration trademarks 
those products for which trademark protection would result in a 
 
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)); W.T. Rogers Co. 
v Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (“‘[A] functional feature is one which 
competitors would have to spend money not to copy but to design around.”); Fiji Water 
Co., LLC v. Fiji Mineral Water USA, LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172–73 (C.D. Cal. 
2010) (defining functionality); In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. 671 F.2d 1332 
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (finding the design of a bottle with a spray top to be an “arbitrary 
decoration-no more de jure functional than is the grille of an automobile with respect to 
its under-the-hood power plant”); see also Clegg, supra note 11, at 277 (explaining that 
functionality typically looks at whether a feature is utilitarian or affects the purpose, use, 
cost, or quality of the product); Samuel Oddi, The Functions of “Functionality” in 
Trademark Law, 22 HOUS. L.REV. 925 (1985) (“Judge Rich equated ‘functional’ (de jure) 
with ‘utilitarian’” and explained that “‘[u]tilitarian’ means ‘superior in function (de 
facto) or economy of manufacture,’ which ‘superiority’ is determined in the light of 
competitive necessity to copy.”); Pierce, supra note 55, at 181 (“[T]he functionality 
doctrine attempts to balance the reputation-related interest of the trademark holder with 
the competitive interests of her competitors.  When the asserted trademark comprises 
useful features of the product at issue, the balance falls on the side of the competitors.”); 
Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 
FLA. L. REV. 243, 245 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“A functional product feature cannot be 
protected as a trademark.”); Id. at 282–83 (discussing Judge Rich’s opinion in In re 
Morton-Norwich Products); Wong, supra note 62, at 1117 (“[T]he courts have held that 
the ‘functional’ features on a product can never be protected under trade-dress law.”); Id. 
at 1119–20 (footnote omitted) (reviewing definitions of functionality); Id. at 1131 
(footnote omitted) (“[A] feature is functional ‘if it is essential to the use or purpose of the 
article or if it affects the cost or quality  of the article.’”).  See generally MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, §§ 7:67–7:78. 
 125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995). 
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perpetual monopoly inconsistent with the utility patent laws.”126  In 
our intellectual property scheme, United States law recognizes that 
new, useful, and nonobvious inventions and discoveries must be 
protected by patent law.127  Patent protection grants to a patentee a 
monopoly that lasts for twenty years from the date of filing a 
patent application.128  That twenty-year period is a fixed duration 
unlike trademark or trade dress protection which may be renewed 
 
 126 Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., Dissenting) 
(citing Vaughn Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int’l Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987)) (“The 
defense exists because granting exclusive rights to functional features of products is the 
domain of patent, not trademark, law.”); see Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 
2d 1115, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2009); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:63 
(“Functionality is a potent public policy, for it trumps all evidence of consumer 
identification of source . . . .”); id. § 7:64 (“It is the functionality rule that demarcates the 
boundary between utility patent law on the one side and the domain of trademark and 
trade dress law on the other.”) (footnote omitted); see also Wong, supra note 62, at 1118 
(“[T]he functionality bar prevents trade-dress law from permanently securing designs that 
are more properly guarded by transitory species of intellectual property [sic] law, such as 
patents or copyrights.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1154 (“There are two apparent purposes 
for the functionality doctrine: (1) to prevent the perpetual monopolization of valuable 
product features, and (2) to partition the law of intellectual property between trademark 
and other forms of protection (e.g., copyright and patent).”) (footnote omitted); 
Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 712 (“For fifty years, both the avoidance of anti-competitive 
effect and mediating any dispute with patent law have been invoked by courts and 
scholars as the reason for the doctrine.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 713–14 (“Preserving 
the integrity of the patent system is thus logically a pivotal part of a competition-based 
functionality concept, and recognition also that the doctrine seeks to protect the climate 
of competition, not the interests of particular competitors.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Thurmon, supra note 124, at 253–82 (chronicling the historical origins and pre-modern 
history of the functionality doctrine in United States trademark law).  
 127 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2006); Sabnis, supra note 96, at 189.   
The functionality requirement prevents trademark law, which seeks 
to promote competition by protecting the goodwill of a source, from 
inhibiting competition by granting exclusive rights to a functional 
product feature. It is the province of patent law to give an inventor a 
limited exclusive right to practice the useful, inventive aspects of a 
product in exchange for its creation and disclosure to the public. 
Nevertheless, the patent owner’s right to exclude competition from 
these product features is not granted without first satisfying four 
stringent requirements: the inventor must show that the invention is 
useful, novel, non-obvious, and described in a way that enables 
others to make and use it. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 128 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
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ad infinitum for successive ten-year periods.129  In addition, patent 
protection grants a broad scope of protection that allows a patentee 
to prevent others from using the patented invention and even any 
invention that is the functional equivalent of it.130  On the other 
hand, trademark and trade dress protection afford an owner a right 
to prevent others from using marks or trade dress that is 
confusingly similar or, in the case of famous marks, trademark and 
trade dress protection prohibits dilution caused by blurring or 
tarnishing.131  These differences between patent protection versus 
trademark and trade dress protection are the principal reasons why 
we carefully police the border line between that which we protect 
by patent and that which we protect by trademark or trade dress.132 
In order to help us police this border, courts have developed a 
systematic mode of analysis in order to determine whether 
elements, components, or aspects of a putative trademark or trade 
dress are functional.  As a rule, something is functional if it 
essential to achieving utilitarian objectives or if it has a significant 
effect on the cost or quality of a product.133  The Qualitex Court 
explained: 
“[i]n general terms, a product feature is functional,” 
and cannot serve as a trademark, “if it is essential to 
the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the 
cost or quality of the article,” that is, if exclusive 
 
 129 Compare id., with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–59 (2006). 
 130 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 
605, 608 (1950) (articulating and explaining the doctrine of equivalents).  
 131 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(c) (2006). 
 132 See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993). 
Although patent rights are limited in duration by statute, trademark 
rights may continue as long as the mark is used to distinguish and 
identify. Significantly, while a patent creates a type of monopoly 
pricing power by giving the patentee the exclusive right to make and 
sell the innovation, a trademark gives the owner only the right to 
preclude others from using the mark when such use is likely to cause 
confusion or to deceive.  
Id.; see MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 2.05[1]. 
 133 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“The 
functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by 
protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing 
a producer to control a useful product feature.”). 
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use of the feature would put competitors at a 
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.134 
Thus, if something is necessary to the operation of a device or 
product, it may be considered functional and, therefore, incapable 
of being protectable as a trademark or trade dress. 
C. Aesthetic Functionality 
Aesthetic functionality, a closely-related doctrine, rests upon 
the principle that there are some products that consumers select 
and purchase primarily for their visual appeal rather than for their 
utilitarian advantages.135  Two foundational cases that illustrate the 
doctrine of aesthetic functionality are Pagliero v. Wallace China 
Co.136 and Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art 
Co.137  In Pagliero, the defendant had copied several of Wallace’s 
china patterns and sold the copied designs on hotel dinnerware.138  
Principally, the attractive nature of the china patterns motivated 
buyers.  Judge Orr emphasized: 
These criteria require the classification of the 
designs in question here as functional.  Affidavits 
introduced by Wallace repeat over and over again 
that one of the essential selling features of hotel 
 
 134 Id. at 165 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 
(1982)). 
 135 See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (“[W]here an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and trademark 
protection would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of adequate 
alternative designs, the aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such protection.”); see also 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, §§ 7:79–7:83 (describing the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine sections); Sabnis, supra note 96, at 189 (“The aesthetic 
functionality doctrine further seeks to protect competition by recognizing that in some 
instances non-useful or decorative product features should be denied trade dress 
protection. Courts have recognized that in some cases, competitors need to copy strictly 
decorative product features in order to be able to compete effectively.”) (footnote 
omitted); Oddi, supra note 124, at 930 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 741 (1938)); 
Thurmon, supra note 124, at 303–08 (discussing aesthetic functionality).  
 136 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). See discussions of this case in MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:79; Wong, supra note 62, at 1132–33; Dinwoodie, supra 
note 4, at 690–94.  
 137 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990). See discussion of this case in MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:80. 
 138 Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 340. 
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china, if, indeed, not the primary, is the design.  The 
attractiveness and eye-appeal of the design sells the 
china.  Moreover, from the standpoint of the 
purchaser china satisfies a demand for the aesthetic 
as well as for the utilitarian, and the design on china 
is, at least in part, the response to such demand.139 
Judge Orr clearly articulated the rationale for the rule of 
aesthetic functionality: 
“Functional” in this sense might be said to connote 
other than a trade-mark [sic] purpose.  If the 
particular feature is an important ingredient in the 
commercial success of the product, the interest in 
free competition permits its imitation in the absence 
of a patent or copyright.  On the other hand, where 
the feature or, more aptly, design, is a mere 
arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress for the 
goods primarily adopted for purposes of 
identification and individuality and, hence, 
unrelated to basic consumer demands in connection 
with the product, imitation may be forbidden . . . .  
Under such circumstances, since effective 
competition may be undertaken without imitation, 
the law grants protection.140 
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that the china patterns 
were not operating as trade dress but rather were necessary 
components of the aesthetic features required in the market (i.e., it 
was “an important ingredient in the commercial success of the 
product”).141  Thus, the court ruled that the design was “a 
 
 139 Id. at 343–44 (footnote omitted). 
 140 Id. at 343 (footnote omitted). 
 141 Id. at 344 (“It seems clear that these designs are not merely indicia of source, os [sic] 
that one who copies them can have no real purpose other than to trade on his competitor’s 
reputation. On the contrary, to imitate is to compete in this type of situation.”); see also 
Wong, supra note 62, at 1139 (“A feature that affects market demand for reasons other 
than the reputation of its source is presumed to be an aspect which ought not be 
monopolized by trademark.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1161 (“Aesthetic functionality 
seeks to partition designs protectable by trademark from those protectable by copyrights 
and utility patents.”).  
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functional feature of the china . . . .”142  One commentator has 
broadly interpreted this case to mean that “[i]f a feature renders a 
product desirable for any reason other than association with a 
source or sponsor, then it is ‘functional’ (i.e., serves a function 
other than identification of source).”143 
In Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 
the defendant sold tableware in a Baroque pattern that resembled 
the plaintiff’s; the defendant’s tableware, however, was much less 
expensive.144  In the lower court, Judge Haight approvingly cited 
Pagliero for the proposition that design elements that are necessary 
to compete in a given market cannot be protected by trade dress 
law.145  To be sure, in order for a twentieth century manufacturer to 
compete in the market for Baroque-style tableware, the 
manufacturer was obliged to embellish its products with certain 
design elements that conveyed or communicated “Baroque” to 
potential purchasers; a manufacturer must convince buyers that the 
tableware fits the criteria necessary to be categorized or considered 
“Baroque.”  Presumably the design elements necessary to evoke 
Baroque-ness cannot be protectable as trade dress.  The lower 
court explained: “The ‘Baroque’ curls, roots and flowers are not 
‘mere indicia of source.’ Instead, they are requirements to compete 
in the silverware market.”146  Indeed, Judge Haight “found that the 
similarities between the Godinger and Wallace designs involved 
elements common to all baroque-style designs used in the 
silverware market.” 147  The Wallace court, concluded, therefore, 
“that, where an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and 
trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by 
limiting the range of adequate alternative designs, the aesthetic 
 
 142 Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 344; see Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 
1148 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing and quoting Pagliero); Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark 
Law, Functional Design Features, and the Trouble with Traffix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 
16 (2001). 
 143 Wong, supra note 62, at 1133. 
 144 916 F.2d. 76, 78–79 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 145 Id. at 78 (citing Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 344). 
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. at 80. 
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functionality doctrine denies such protection.”148  In this regard, 
refusing trademark protection on the basis of aesthetic 
functionality shares the underlying policy of refusing trademark 
protection on the basis of utilitarian functionality.  As Professor 
Oddi notes: 
there has been general agreement that a feature of a 
product which affects its utility or its efficiency of 
use or manufacture is not the proper subject matter 
of trademark.  The policy rationale underlying the 
denial of trademark protection on the basis of 
‘utility’ or ‘efficiency functionality’ is that 
competitors would be hindered in competition if 
they could not copy features which affect the 
efficiency or utility of the product upon which 
consumer demand is based.149 
In a recent California case involving the issue of aesthetic 
functionality as it relates to plush toys, the district court remarked: 
Unlike logos, the aesthetic features of plush toys. . . 
are essential selling features of the toys.  Comparing 
logos and company names, on the one hand, and 
plush toys and china patterns, on the other, aids in 
discerning what constitutes an “aesthetic purpose 
wholly independent of any source-identifying 
function.” A manufacturer or designer has an 
incentive to make a china pattern or plush toy 
aesthetically pleasing because that drives the 
consumer’s decision to buy the plate or toy.  Such 
designs are, therefore, functional.  By contrast, 
aesthetically pleasing as a logo may be, it merely 
identifies the source of the product.150 
 
 148 Id. at 81 (citing THIRD RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, UNFAIR COMPETITION 
(Preliminary Draft No. 3), Ch. 3, § 17(c) at 213–14.). 
 149 Oddi, supra note 124, at 961. 
 150 Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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D. Traffix Issues 
In Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., the 
Supreme Court, in dictum, articulated the rules of utilitarian 
functionality and aesthetic functionality in a manner that appeared 
to somewhat alter the technical definitions of those concepts.151  
Although it is unlikely that the dictum from this case will 
materially affect the applicability of suggestions made in this 
Article, it is, nevertheless, worthwhile to consider the potential 
changes created by Traffix.  The Traffix Court held that an expired 
patent on the company’s dual spring-support of a road sign was 
strong evidence of the utilitarian functionality of the design.152  In 
explaining the applicable law regarding functionality, the Court 
noted that “a functional feature is one the ‘exclusive use of [which] 
would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.’”153  Referencing the decisions in both Qualitex and 
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,154 Justice 
Kennedy wrote that, 
a feature is also functional when it is essential to the 
use or purpose of the device or when it affects the 
cost or quality of the device.  The Qualitex decision 
did not purport to displace this traditional rule.  
Instead, it quoted the rule as Inwood had set it forth.  
It is proper to inquire into a ‘significant non-
 
 151 See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 24 (2001) (holding 
that product features with aesthetic value require different treatment than features with 
utilitarian value.  The competitive need standard still applies to aesthetic features, but a 
different standard applies to utilitarian features.  Though courts are divided on exactly 
what the utilitarian standard is, it is clear that more designs will be deemed functional, 
and thus denied trademark protection, under this standard than under the competitive 
need standard.  The distinction between aesthetics and utility, therefore, is now extremely 
important); Thurmon, supra note 124, at 250; Weinberg, supra note 142, at 3 (criticizing 
the Traffix Court’s treatment of “functionality”). 
 152 Traffix Devices Inc., 532 U.S. at 29 (“A prior patent, we conclude, has vital 
significance in resolving the trade dress claim. A utility patent is strong evidence that the 
features therein claimed are functional.”); Id. at 30 (“Where the expired patent claimed 
the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the 
heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it 
is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.”); see also 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:89.  
 153 Traffix Devices Inc., 532 U.S. at 32. 
 154 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
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reputation-related disadvantage’ in cases of esthetic 
functionality, the question involved in Qualitex.155 
Some commentators and courts have expressed concern that 
this dictum from the Traffix decision may have created one rule for 
utilitarian functionality and a separate rule for aesthetic 
functionality.156  However, whether courts will embrace, or already 
have embraced, this distinction remains open to question.157  Some 
recent cases suggest that courts have not adopted Traffix as a total 
departure from prior definitions of “functionality,” and that the 
initial worries of a rewriting of the law of functionality have not 
been realized.  For example, the Court of Appeals of Texas 
recently stated: 
Generally, a product is functional if it (1) is 
essential to the use or purpose of the article, or (2) 
affects the cost or quality of the article.  If the 
asserted trade dress is not functional under this 
initial test, courts may also consider the 
“competitive necessity” test of whether the 
exclusive use of the feature or design “would put 
 
 155 Traffix Devices Inc., 532 U.S. at 33. 
 156 Thurmon, supra note 124, at 326 (“The Supreme Court granted certiorari in TrafFix 
to resolve a relatively minor question concerning the relevance of an expired utility 
patent and ended up rewriting the entire law of functionality.  Gone is the uniform use of 
competitive need functionality standard. Gone is the consistent treatment of all 
functionality questions, whether aesthetic or utilitarian.  In their place are inconsistent 
and largely incomprehensible standards and distinctions.”). 
 157 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:80 (commenting on Traffix, 
Professor McCarthy remarks: “Justice Kennedy further muddied the waters of the 
aesthetic functionality theory” and that  “Justice Kennedy’s confusing dictum in Traffix 
only further clouded and obscured the issue whether aesthetic functionality is in fact to be 
given any weight.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Thurmon, supra note 124, at 360 
(advocating that courts ought to return to a standard focused on competitive need as the 
benchmark for determining functionality, and that the same standard ought to apply to 
both utilitarian and aesthetic functionality); Clegg, supra note 11, at 295–302 (discussing 
the potential changes to the definition of “functionality” that Traffix may have brought 
about); Weinberg, supra note 142, at 6 (“Traffix may cause other trouble as well. For 
example, it needlessly states two functionality standards, one for useful design features 
and one for aesthetic design features.”). 
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competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.158 
Citing Traffix, the Texas court said: “Without objection, the 
jury was instructed that ‘[a] product feature is considered 
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the product or if 
it affects the cost or quality of the product.’”159  But other courts 
have interpreted Traffix as having established a new rule.  For 
example in Atlas Equipment Co., LLC v. Weir Supply Group, Inc. 
the Washington District Court quoted Traffix for the proposition 
that “competitive necessity is the proper inquiry in cases of 
‘[a]esthetic functionality,’ such as where the color of a product is 
at issue,” and thus reasoned that “[t]he present case is not a case of 
aesthetic functionality and, thus, there is no need to analyze the 
competitive necessity” of the product design.160  The Ninth Circuit 
has also interpreted Traffix as permitting an inquiry into 
competition in cases involving aesthetic functionality.161 
E. Relationship Between Functionality and Genericity 
At this juncture, it will be useful to consider the relationship 
between the concepts of functionality and genericity.  The Wallace 
opinion explicitly connects the dots between these two concepts: 
Wallace may not exclude competitors from using 
those baroque design elements necessary to 
compete in the market for baroque silverware.  It is 
a first principle of trademark law that an owner may 
not use the mark as a means of excluding 
competitors from a substantial market.  Where a 
 
 158 Astoria Indus. of Iowa, Inc. v. Brand FX Body Co., 2010 WL 1433404, at *3 (Tex. 
App. 2010) (footnotes omitted). 
 159 Astoria Indus. of Iowa, Inc., 2010 WL 1433404, at n.16 (“Without objection, the 
jury was instructed that “[a] product feature is considered functional if it is essential to 
the use or purpose of the product or if it affects the cost or quality of the product.”). 
 160 Atlas Equip. Co., LLC v. Weir Supply Grp., Inc., C07-1358Z, 2009 WL 4670154, at 
n.11 (W.D. Wash. 2009). 
 161 Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071–72 (9th 
Cir. 2006).  A California District Court followed this reasoning in Aurora World, Inc. v. 
Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2009)). 
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mark becomes the generic term to describe an 
article, for example, trademark protection ceases.162 
Thus, the court “perceive[d] no distinction between a claim to 
exclude all others from use on silverware of basic elements of a 
decorative style and claims to generic names, basic colors or 
designs important to a product’s utility.”163  Similarly, Judge 
Cudahy, dissenting in Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., stated: “What is at 
stake here is the right to copy the thing itself—that is, to copy its 
configuration or design.  The configuration or design of a product 
is as generic as the name of the product.”164 
As trademark law concepts, functionality and genericity are 
intimately related.  No one may claim the exclusive right to a 
generic symbol because all competitors in any given market must 
have the freedom to use generic symbols in order to convey 
truthful information to potential buyers.165  Similarly, no one may 
claim the exclusive right to the functional elements of a product 
because, absent patent protection, all competitors in a given market 
must have the freedom to use the functional elements of a 
product.166  In one sense, these concepts blur into one as trademark 
laws typically attempt to keep “functional product characteristics” 
free for the public to use.167  For example, the word “apple,” if 
used in association with the fruit, would certainly be seen as a 
generic term and be ineligible for trademark protection.168  
Additionally, the word “apple,” due to its generic meaning, serves 
a descriptive purpose in identifying the characteristics of a specific 
 
 162 Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 
1990) (citations omitted); see Pierce, supra note 55, at 183–87 (explaining the strong 
similarity between the concept of genericity and functionality, citing illustrative cases and 
scholarship). 
 163 Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc., 916 F.2d at 81. 
 164 Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 647 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., Dissenting). 
 165 Carol A. Melton, Generic Term or Trademark? Confusing Legal Standards and 
Inadequate Protection, 29 Am. U. L. Rev. 109, 110 (1979). 
 166 Traffix Devices Inc., 532 U.S. at 29. 
 167 Martin Senftleben, Study on Misappropriation of Signs, COMMITTEE ON 
DEVELOPMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Mar. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_9/cdip_9_inf_5.pdf. 
 168 Uche U. Ewelukwa, Comparative Trademark Law: Fair Use Defense in the United 
States and Europe—The Changing Landscape of Trademark Law, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 
97, 103 (2007). 
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type of fruit.169  But when removed from that context and used in 
conjunction with computer products, the word “apple” becomes 
arbitrary.170  Arbitrary marks are protected, as they do not preclude 
competitors from being able to use the generic or functional terms 
to describe the product.171  Potential trademark protection also 
extends to symbols.172  However, like words, these symbols can be 
deemed generic.173  A graphic representation of an apple could be 
considered generic when used in conjunction with fruit sales.174  
The same apple shape could be considered descriptive if used in 
association with apple-flavored yogurt.175  And, again, as was the 
case with the word “apple,” the shape of an apple would be 
arbitrary when used in conjunction with computer products and 
 
 169 Id. at 103. 
 170 Id. at 104–05. 
 171 Id. at 105. 
 172 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 11:16.50 
 173 Id. §§ 7:36–7:37 (Professor McCarthy explains that a picture of a product may be 
considered “generic.”) 
 174 See Application of McIlhenny Co., 278 F.2d 953, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“It has long 
been the law that a mere pictorial representation of goods cannot be registered as a 
trademark for the reason that it is descriptive of the goods and does not indicate origin.”) 
(citations omitted); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 11:16.50 (“In the same 
way that pictorial nonword [sic] designations can become generic of a product or service, 
so can such symbols be descriptive of a product or service.  For example, a picture that is 
merely a representation of the goods themselves is regarded as merely descriptive of the 
goods.  Some images may be as descriptive of a product as are words.  For example, a 
pine-tree shape of an air freshener describes the piney scent of the product.  Or, an image 
may be so widely used and so closely associated with a product or service that it is the 
equivalent of descriptive words.  Such descriptive images should be free for all merchants 
to use unless one has achieved secondary meaning in a particular embodiment of the 
image.”) (footnotes omitted); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 8:6.50 (“The 
courts have held that a package or product shape can lack protection as being ‘generic’ if 
the trade dress is defined as a mere product theme or style of doing business or is such a 
hackneyed or common design that it cannot identify a particular source . . . the Ninth 
Circuit found that the concept of a picture of a grape leaf on a bottle of wine was a 
generic designation and not a protectable mark.”); see also Oddi, supra note 124, at 935. 
(this understanding comports with the historical origins of language and writing.  Ancient 
Egyptian hieroglyphs included what Egyptologists refer to as “ideograms.” Simply stated, 
ideograms are one type of Egyptian hieroglyph that meant what the object represented); 
see also Paul Douglas Callister, Law’s Box: Law, Jurisprudence and the Information 
Ecosphere, 74 UMKC L. REV. 263, 296 (2005) (explaining that ancient Egyptians used 
hieroglyphics as ideograms to represent specific ideas); see infra note 284 and 
accompanying text. 
 175 Ewelukwa, supra note 131, at 103. 
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thus eligible for protection within that industry.176  The functions 
of the term “apple” and an apple shape differ between industries.177  
While the functions are generic and ineligible for protection within 
fruit sales, they can be protected within computer sales as they 
distinguish a source of origin.178 
F. Proper Application of the Doctrine of Functionality Makes the 
Wal-Mart Tripartite Analysis Unnecessary 
There is no need to create a special rule, requiring proof of 
secondary meaning, for colors and product designs.  As Judge 
Motz suggested in Ashley Furniture, when used in conjunction 
with the Abercrombie analysis, utilitarian functionality and 
aesthetic functionality serve the same purpose, and serve that 
purpose better.179  In the case of colors, a color is functional (or 
perhaps generic or descriptive) if it immediately conveys a 
cognitive association in the minds of relevant consumers between 
itself and the product.180  For example, arguably the color brown 
for chocolate milk is either generic or aesthetically functional.  The 
brown color of the milk immediately conveys chocolate flavor to 
consumers.181  Similarly, in Wal-Mart, the children’s clothing 
motifs that Justice Scalia characterized as “product design” were 
aesthetically functional, because a principal factor motivating 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 David W. Barnes, One Trademark Per Source, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 15 
(2009) (“An apple orchard may put the word “apple” on its products despite Apple Inc.’s 
trademark rights for use of APPLE as a source-indicator for computers and computer 
programs.”). 
 178 Id. at 15; see also Apple Trademark List, APPLE (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://www.apple.com/legal/trademark/appletmlist.html. 
 179 See supra Part I.E. (the Abercrombie continuum provides the basic tools necessary, 
and the functionality doctrine provides a safety net to ensure that neither the utilitarian 
nor aesthetic features of a product’s configuration are protected as trademarks or trade 
dress). 
 180 See Bartow, supra note 60, at 272. 
 181 See id. at 268 (“And there can be no trademark protection when a color has a 
function, which it always will when it is a product feature.”); Id. at 272–74 (explaining 
the high likelihood that colors will be functional in nearly all contexts); MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:49 (“Functional uses of color are not protectable”) 
(Professor McCarthy provides numerous examples of functional colors from case law); 
see also Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
(discussing the functionality of colors in specific cases). 
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consumer purchases was the desire to buy clothing that bore 
attractive, playful artwork.182  In a recent California case involving 
the issue of aesthetic functionality as it relates to plush toys, the 
court remarked: 
Unlike logos, the aesthetic features of plush toys . . . 
are essential selling features of the toys.  Comparing 
logos and company names, on the one hand, and 
plush toys and china patterns, on the other, aids in 
discerning what constitutes an “aesthetic purpose 
wholly independent of any source-identifying 
function.”  A manufacturer or designer has an 
incentive to make a china pattern or plush toy 
aesthetically pleasing because that drives the 
consumer’s decision to buy the plate or toy.  Such 
designs are, therefore, functional.183 
Colors, like cuteness and cute visual images, routinely lend 
attractiveness to products.  When consumers want products 
because they like the colors, the colors are not operating as 
indicators of source.  The Colorado District Court in Predator 
International, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc., explained that the 
red-colored tip on air gun pellets functioned in precisely this 
manner: 
That the tips look “cool” and that the shape and red 
tip combined might be “interesting” to consumers 
does not establish that the red tip has achieved 
secondary meaning as a source identifier.  Instead, it 
appears that the red tip has an aesthetic quality, one 
 
 182 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (“In the 
case of product design, as in the case of color, we think consumer predisposition to 
equate the feature with the source does not exist. Consumers are aware of the reality that, 
almost invariably, even the most unusual of product designs-such as a cocktail shaker 
shaped like a penguin-is intended not to identify the source, but to render the product 
itself more useful or more appealing.”). 
 183 Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citation 
omitted). 
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which competitors, in the absence of secondary 
meaning, are free to copy.184 
The same may be said about ordinary product shapes.  It is 
common for consumers to react positively to shapes that may be 
merely mundane yet aesthetically pleasing.  In a 2012 case 
involving the shape of tequila bottles, the California District Court 
noted: 
To the extent that the . . . plaintiffs define their trade 
dress to be a trapezoidal-shaped bottle, this Court 
agrees with the . . . defendants that there is no 
inherent distinctiveness.  “A trapezoid is the sort of 
intuitive, ‘ordinary geometric shape’ that courts 
generally ‘regard [] as non-distinctive and 
protectable only upon proof of secondary 
meaning.’”185 
In a similar manner, rather than needing to characterize the 
clothing motifs at issue in Wal-Mart as product designs or a 
tertium quid, a more efficient and preferable mode of analysis 
would be simply to hold that the clothing motifs were—just as the 
functional features of plush toys or a trapezoidal bottle—
aesthetically functional, and not protectable at all.186  Interpreting 
the Samara Brothers designs as aesthetically functional would 
prevent the designs from operating as trademarks even if the 
manufacturer were to present proof that they had acquired a 
secondary meaning.187  Secondary meaning is irrelevant vis-à-vis 
functionality.188  Thus, recognizing the Samara Brothers’ designs 
 
 184 Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1249 (D. 
Colo. 2009). 
 185 E & J Gallo v. Proximo Spirits, Inc., 2012 WL 273076, at 12 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 
(citation omitted). 
 186 See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (holding “where an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and 
trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of 
adequate alternative designs, the aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such protection”). 
 187 See id. at 80 (“the commercial success of an aesthetic feature automatically destroys 
all of the originator’s trademark interest in it, notwithstanding the feature’s secondary 
meaning”). 
 188 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2006) (“In a civil action for trade dress infringement . . . 
the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter 
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as aesthetically functional would strengthen the public domain by 
preventing such designs from ever garnering trademark protection. 
The same could be said for Justice Scalia’s hypothetical 
penguin-shaped cocktail shaker.189  Consumers, presumably, 
would be motivated to purchase such products because of the 
artwork—their desire to have a shaker in the shape of a cute Arctic 
bird.  Because a penguin-shaped cocktail shaker is aesthetically 
functional, it also would be incapable of acquiring trademark status 
even if its manufacturer were to make a prima facie showing of 
secondary meaning.190  Consequently, in the absence of a design 
patent,191 competitors would be free to sell penguin-shaped 
cocktail shakers so long as they did not infringe the manufacturer’s 
copyright.  Presumably others would be free to copy the idea of a 
penguin-shaped shaker so long as they do not copy the 
manufacturer’s expression.192  As the court in Aurora World, Inc. 
v. Ty Inc., remarked regarding the functionality of plush toys, “[i]t 
is the toys’ aesthetics that drive the consumer to purchase them; 
this functionality exists independent of its source-identifying 
function.”193  This is the same principle that allowed Godinger to 
manufacture Baroque tableware.194  Courts will have an 
opportunity to employ a less burdensome approach if they analyze 
cases like Wal-Mart not as cases involving product designs that 
require proof of secondary meaning as an antecedent to protection, 
but rather as cases involving artistic features that may or may not 
be aesthetically functional.  Not only is the analysis itself simpler 
but it also increases the likelihood of strengthening the public 
domain as well.195 
 
sought to be protected is not functional.”); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 4,  § 
7:63 (“For functional items, no amount of evidence of secondary meaning . . . will create 
a right to exclude.”) (footnote omitted). 
 189 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000). 
 190 See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc., 916 F.2d at 80–81. 
 191 See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006) (“Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental 
design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”); MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:90 (“Nature of a design patent”). 
 192 See infra Part III. C. 
 193 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 194 See supra text accompanying notes 107–12. 
 195 See Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 704. 
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Consider in addition, for example, a case such as Two Pesos.  
In Two Pesos, the jury below had determined that the restaurant 
décor at issue was not functional.196  The Court emphasized that 
the appellate court had reached the same conclusion.197  When 
considered in light of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, it is 
entirely possible that that factual determination was ill-advised or, 
perhaps, just plain wrong.198  In any event, it was certainly not a 
foregone conclusion.  Arguably, certain artistic elements of a 
restaurant’s décor may, in many circumstances, prove to be 
functional, or perhaps generic or descriptive.  Restaurant patrons 
typically, for example, associate pictures on a restaurant’s wall of 
locations in Greece (e.g., Athens’ famous Acropolis, Greek 
islands, and the like) as aesthetically functional elements.  As has 
been suggested, we might even regard such décor as generic.  
Other ethnic cuisines readily come to mind.  Chinese dragons, 
photos of sites of readily-identifiable places in Italy such as the 
leaning tower of Pisa, the Coliseum, and the like, serve the same 
purposes, and may easily be construed as generic motifs or 
aesthetically functional for purposes of trademark and trade dress 
protectability.  In Two Pesos, the Court, quoting the Fifth Circuit’s 
opinion, explained: “Taco Cabana describes its Mexican trade 
dress as 
 
The conceptual role for the functionality doctrine is not to cut a broad 
swathe through trade dress protection but rather to facilitate the 
courts’ “careful and reasoned” assessment of the effects that 
individual instances of protection will have on competition.  
Functionality is to operate as a scalpel, not a scimitar. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 196 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 766 (1992) (“The jury’s 
answers were: Taco Cabana has a trade dress; taken as a whole, the trade dress is 
nonfunctional; the trade dress is inherently distinctive; the trade dress has not acquired a 
secondary meaning in the Texas market . . . .”).  It should be noted that it was the jury 
that had the authority to decide whether the trade dress was functional:  “All courts have 
held that the enquiry as to functionality is a question of fact.”  MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 7:71 (footnote omitted). 
 197 Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 770 (“Both courts thus ruled that Taco Cabana’s trade 
dress was not descriptive but rather inherently distinctive, and that it was not 
functional.”). 
 198 See Thurmon, supra note 124, at 293–94 (discussing Two Pesos and Qualitex, 
emphasizing their affect on the doctrine of functionality); Sabnis, supra note 96, at 190–
92 (discussing Two Pesos and Qualitex). 
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a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining 
and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright 
colors, paintings and murals.  The patio includes 
interior and exterior areas with the interior patio 
capable of being sealed off from the outside patio 
by overhead garage doors.  The stepped exterior of 
the building is a festive and vivid color scheme 
using top border paint and neon stripes.  Bright 
awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.”199 
To be sure, arguably some, if not many or all, of these elements 
of Taco Cabana’s putative trade dress were descriptive, generic, or 
functional.  As a practical matter, “dining and patio areas decorated 
with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals”200 of Mexican 
and Southwestern themes simply are not distinctive; these motifs 
are as commonplace (i.e., generic, descriptive, or functional) as a 
Greek key and murals of the Acropolis are for Greek restaurants.  
It would be incredible if one restaurant were legally able to 
monopolize such standard elements of restaurant décor. 
The rationale for requiring proof of secondary meaning as a 
prerequisite for descriptive marks is sound.201  Congress forged 
that requirement as part of the Lanham Act.202  The Wal-Mart 
tripartite analysis artificially separates colors and product designs 
from other putative trademarks and trade dress, and establishes a 
rule that they, like descriptive marks, must acquire a secondary 
meaning before they may be considered valid trademarks.203  
Without empirical data as support, the Wal-Mart Court unilaterally 
assumed that colors and product designs do not automatically 
communicate source to potential consumers.204  In truth, word 
marks and product packaging do not necessarily communicate 
source to potential buyers either.  The Abercrombie analysis 
 
 199 Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 765 (citation omitted). 
 200 Id. 
 201 See In re Oppendahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173 (2004) (“Descriptive 
marks can qualify for registration on the Principal Register if they acquire secondary 
meaning.”). 
 202 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006). 
 203 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212, 214–15 (2000). 
 204 Id. at 212. 
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teaches that we can only determine whether word marks and 
product packaging may operate as valid trademarks or trade dress 
after we have first analyzed them contextually.205  In order to 
analyze them contextually, a fact-finder must juxtapose them with 
the products that the putative marks represent and then determine 
the cognitive links, or associations, in the minds of an appreciable 
number of relevant consumers, between the putative mark and the 
product.  It is only by applying that analysis that a fact-finder can 
accurately determine whether the word mark or product packaging 
(i.e., the putative mark) is generic (or functional), descriptive, 
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful. 
The same analysis ought to work for colors and product 
designs.  Colors and product designs that are generic or functional 
cannot operate as protectable trademarks or trade dress under any 
circumstances.206  Otherwise, colors and product designs that are 
descriptive may operate as protectable trademarks or trade dress 
upon proof of secondary meaning.  When analyzing colors and 
product designs as potential trademarks, a focus on the 
Abercrombie analysis, coupled with utilitarian functionality and 
aesthetic functionality—rather than applying Wal-Mart’s tripartite 
per se rule of secondary meaning—will both improve the 
efficiency of analysis and strengthen the public domain. 
III. ANALYTICAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN FUNCTIONALITY, 
CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY, AND IDEA-EXPRESSION 
A. Overview 
Both judges and commentators have written a great deal about 
utilitarian functionality and aesthetic functionality.207  The core of 
the functionality doctrine has been described in many ways such as 
 
 205 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 22 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(finding the “defendant’s use of ‘Safari’ with respect to boots was made in the context of 
hunting and traveling expeditions and not as an attempt to garner A&F’s good will”). 
 206 See Bartow, supra note 60, at 264 (“Colors always add aesthetic value, and often 
communicate messages unrelated to commercial source.”). 
 207 See e.g., Clegg, supra note 11; Dinwoodie, supra note 4; Oddi, supra note 124; 
Pierce, supra note 55; Thurmon, supra note 124; Weinberg, supra note 142; Wong, supra 
note 62; see also Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 685 n.278 (citing numerous articles). 
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“whether the feature is ‘superior or optimal,’ ‘essential to the use 
or purpose of the article,’ or ‘an important ingredient in the 
product’s success . . . .’”208  Distilled to its essentials, an analysis 
of utilitarian functionality is an effort to separate certain non-
protectable elements, or aspects, of a putative mark from other 
elements or aspects that are protectable by trademark or trade dress 
law.  In particular, elements that promote mechanical or utilitarian 
objectives are considered “functional” and therefore are not 
protectable as trademarks.209  Elements that operate to 
communicate a cognitive link between the putative mark and the 
producer are, at least theoretically, protectable as trademarks or 
trade dress.  In a similar manner, the aesthetic functionality inquiry 
also requires that we endeavor to separate certain non-protectable 
elements, or aspects, of a putative mark from protectable elements 
or aspects.  In particular, elements that are necessary to 
communicate a particular style (e.g., the Baroque-style in Wallace 
v. Godinger) or elements that communicate a general idea or 
concept (e.g., the children’s clothing motifs and even Justice 
Scalia’s hypothetical penguin-shaped cocktail shaker in Wal-Mart) 
are not protectable, whereas ornamental elements that are not 
essential to conveying a style, concept, or general idea are 
theoretically protectable as trademarks because they may 
communicate a cognitive association between the product and the 
producer that is distinct from the style, concept, or general idea.210 
Fortunately, lawyers and judges schooled in intellectual 
property are familiar with this mode of analysis, because it is 
precisely the same mode of analysis involved in Copyright law’s 
issues of conceptual separability and the idea-expression 
dichotomy.211  For pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, 
copyright protection is available for such works insofar as their 
artistic elements are concerned but not for their utilitarian 
elements.212  In simple terms, this is the functionality doctrine at 
 
 208 Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 686. 
 209 See supra text accompanying notes 87–88. 
 210 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000); Wallace Int’l 
Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 211 Wong, supra note 62, at 1160–61. 
 212 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”). 
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work in copyright law.  One commentator has explained this 
obvious connection clearly: 
Although copyright functionality is not identical to 
trademark functionality, they operate on the same 
basic principles.  A design that has utility may not 
receive copyright protection because it is 
“functional.” Thus, the design can, at most, be 
patented.  Because a patent’s duration is shorter 
than that of copyright, the operation of copyright 
functionality confirms the theory that a feature’s 
functionality limits the duration of protection that 
feature may receive.  Moreover, copyright’s 
functionality enables copyrightable products to be 
separated from patentable products.213 
The Copyright Act expressly states this principle of conceptual 
separability,214 and the judiciary, in several famous cases such as 
Mazer v. Stein,215 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,216 
and Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,217 
has interpreted it thoughtfully.  The idea-expression dichotomy 
employs the same analytic process in an effort to draw a line 
between protectable expression versus unprotectable ideas.  The 
Copyright Act articulates this rule,218 and well-known cases, such 
as Baker v. Selden,219 Judge Learned Hand’s classic opinion in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.220 and Herbert Rosenthal 




 213 Wong, supra note 62, at 1160–61 (footnotes omitted).   
 214 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (provides a definition of “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works”). 
 215 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). 
 216 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 217 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 218 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2006). 
 219 101 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1880). 
 220 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 221 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).  
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B. Conceptual Separability Analysis 
The Copyright Act expressly protects “[p]ictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works” as a distinct category of “works of authorship,” 
and, therefore, protectable, copyrightable subject matter.222  The 
Act defines “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works as follows: 
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include 
two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of 
fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints 
and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, 
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, 
including architectural plans.  Such works shall 
include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as 
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian 
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful 
article, as defined in this section, shall be 
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work 
only if, and only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features that can be identified separately from, and 
are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.223 
This provision of the Copyright Act is relevant to trade dress 
because product packaging frequently contains two-dimensional 
pictorial and/or graphic material, and because a product’s design 
(i.e., its overall shape or configuration) may be considered a three-
dimensional sculptural work.  The Act expressly draws a line 
between the artistic features of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works versus the utilitarian features of such works.  Courts have 
successfully applied this principle.  The landmark case that 
established this tenet, well before its statutory embodiment, was 
Mazer v. Stein.224  Mazer involved statuettes of dancers that were 
being used as a lamp bases.225  The principal issue in the case was 
 
 222 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(5). 
 223 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 224 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). 
 225 Id. at 203. 
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whether the product’s design—its human-dancer-shape—was 
protected by copyright law.226  According to Justice Reed: 
This case involves the validity of copyrights 
obtained by respondents for statuettes of male and 
female dancing figures made of semivitreous china.  
The controversy centers around the fact that 
although copyrighted as ‘works of art,’ the 
statuettes were intended for use and used as bases 
for table lamps, with electric wiring, sockets and 
lamp shades attached.227 
The defendant argued that, because the statuettes served as a 
lamp bases, they were functional.228  The United States Supreme 
Court recognized the need to separate the artistic elements of the 
shape from the functional elements.229  The artistic features that 
were required to communicate human form to a viewer were 
theoretically protectable by copyright, whereas the features that 
enabled the device to enclose wires and support a light bulb and 
lampshade were not protectable by copyright because they were 
utilitarian.230  Citing the Copyright Office Regulations in force at 
the time,231 the Court remarked that “artistic articles are protected 
in ‘form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects.’”232 
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp. involved 
mannequins.233  This case is especially interesting and potentially 
instructive in terms of trademark analysis because the issues 
actually relate to both utilitarian and aesthetic functionality.234  The 
plaintiff had created four mannequin shapes: two naked torsos 
(male and female) and two clothed torsos (one with a traditional 
men’s button-down, collared shirt and the other with a buttoned 
 
 226 Id. at 205. 
 227 Id. at 202. 
 228 Id. at 215–16. 
 229 Id. at 218. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Copyright Office Registration of Claims to Copyright, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1959), 
the language of which now appears in the current definition of “pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works” at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 232 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218. 
 233 Carol Bernhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 234 Id. at 414. 
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women’s blouse).235  The Second Circuit addressed the question of 
whether these mannequin shapes were copyrightable.236  The 
district judge had granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on grounds that the mannequins were “utilitarian articles 
not containing separable works of art, and thus are not 
copyrightable.”237  The Second Circuit affirmed.238  Judge 
Mansfield framed the question: “Since the four Barnhart forms are 
concededly useful articles, the crucial issue in determining their 
copyrightability is whether they possess artistic or aesthetic 
features that are physically or conceptually separable from their 
utilitarian dimension.”239  The court, in a footnote, quoted at length 
the House Report that accompanied the 1976 Copyright Act: 
A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic 
work is still capable of being identified as such 
when it is printed on or applied to utilitarian articles 
such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and 
the like.  The same is true when a statute or carving 
is used to embellish an industrial product or, as in 
the Mazer case, is incorporated into a product 
without losing its ability to exist independently as a 
work of art.  On the other hand, although the shape 
 
 235 Id. at 412. 
The bones of contention are four human torso forms designed by 
Barnhart, each of which is life-size, without neck, arms, or a back, 
and made of expandable white styrene.  Plaintiff’s president created 
the forms in 1982 by using clay, buttons, and fabric to develop an 
initial mold, which she then used to build an aluminum mold into 
which the poly-styrene is poured to manufacture the sculptural 
display form.  There are two male and two female upper torsos.  One 
each of the male and female torsos is unclad for the purpose of 
displaying shirts and sweaters, while the other two are sculpted with 
shirts for displaying sweaters and jackets.  All the forms, which are 
otherwise life-like and anatomically accurate, have hollow backs 
designed to hold excess fabric when the garment is fitted onto the 
form. 
Id.  
 236 Id. 
 237 Id.; see also id. at 414 (“[Th]e district court determined that since the Barnhart forms 
possessed no aesthetic features that could exist, either physically or conceptually, 
separate from the forms as utilitarian articles, they were not copyrightable.”). 
 238 Id. at 419. 
 239 Id. at 414. 
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of an industrial product may be aesthetically 
satisfying and valuable, the Committee’s intention 
is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill.  
Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’ 
dress, food processor, television set, or any other 
industrial product contains some element that, 
physically or conceptually, can be identified as 
separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, 
the design would not be copyrighted under the bill.  
The test of separability and independence from “the 
utilitarian aspects of the article” does not depend 
upon the nature of the design-that is, even if the 
appearance of an article is determined by esthetic 
(as opposed to functional) considerations, only 
elements, if any, which can be identified separately 
from the useful article as such are copyrightable.  
And, even if the three-dimensional design contains 
some such element (for example, a carving on the 
back of a chair or a floral relief design on silver 
flatware), copyright protection would extend only to 
that element, and would not cover the over-all 
configuration of the utilitarian article as such.240 
According to the court, “Congress has explicitly refused 
copyright protection for works of applied art or industrial design 
which have aesthetic or artistic features that cannot be identified 
separately from the useful article.  Such works are not 
copyrightable regardless of the fact that they may be ‘aesthetically 
satisfying and valuable.’”241  The court, thus, concluded: 
“[a]pplying these principles, we are persuaded that since the 
aesthetic and artistic features of the Barnhart forms are inseparable 
from the forms’ use as utilitarian articles the forms are not 
copyrightable.”242 
 
 240 Id. at 417 n.3 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 55 (1976)). 
 241 Id. at 418 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 55 (1976)). 
 242 Id. 
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It is clear just how much the court’s analysis resembles the 
trademark examination of aesthetic functionality without actually 
using that term.  According to the court, 
[i]n the case of the Barnhart form . . . the features 
claimed to be aesthetic or artistic, e.g., the life-size 
configuration of the breasts and the width of the 
shoulders, are inextricably intertwined with the 
utilitarian feature, the display of clothes.  Whereas a 
model of a human torso, in order to serve its 
utilitarian function, must have some configuration 
of the chest and some width of shoulders.243 
As a practical matter, indeed, a merchant selling clothing could 
offer her wares without displaying samples on mannequins.  In 
addition, someone selling clothing could use mannequins that 
merely approximate human shape, with no additional anatomical 
or artistic elements to identify gender or anything but the most 
simple and utilitarian body shape.  Presumably, one may envision 
such mannequins in the most rudimentary, unvarnished 
approximation of human form (and presumably such plainly-
shaped mannequins exist).  Presumably such mannequins would be 
devoid of individualistic human features, and would be considered 
entirely functional in a utilitarian sense.  But, as the opinion 
implies, a merchant selling men’s shirts and women’s blouses 
could use the naked Carol Barnhart torsos to display such clothing.  
And, similarly, someone selling outer-ware, such as sweaters, 
coats, or jackets could use the clothed Carol Barnhart torsos to 
display that type of clothing.  As the Second Circuit remarked 
when discussing this later in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade 
Pacific Lumber Co.: “the distinctive features of the torsos—the 
accurate anatomical design and the sculpted shirts and collars-
showed clearly the influence of functional concerns.”244 
Brandir International, Inc. involved the copyrightability of a 
ribbon-shaped bicycle rack, specifically, “a bicycle rack made of 
bent tubing that is said to have originated from a wire 
 
 243 Id. at 419. 
 244 Brandir Int’l, Inc, v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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sculpture.”245  The Second Circuit determined that the ribbon-
shape could not be separated from the utilitarian purpose of the 
rack to allow storage of multiple bicycles.246  Judge Oakes quoted 
with approval Professor Robert Denicola’s now-famous article: 
“Professor Denicola points out that although the Copyright Act of 
1976 was an effort ‘to draw as clear a line as possible,’ in truth 
‘there is no line, but merely a spectrum of forms and shapes 
responsive in varying degrees to utilitarian concerns.’” 247  Judge 
Oakes then captured the essence of Professor Denicola’s analysis: 
To state the Denicola test in the language of 
conceptual separability, if design elements reflect a 
merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, 
the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be 
conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements.  
Conversely, where design elements can be 
identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic 
judgment exercised independently of functional 
influences, conceptual separability exists.248 
Thus, the court determined that the utilitarian elements of the 
ribbon-shape were incapable of existing separately from the 
putative artistic elements: “Applying Professor Denicola’s test to 
the RIBBON Rack, we find that the rack is not copyrightable.  It 
seems clear that the form of the rack is influenced in significant 
measure by utilitarian concerns and thus any aesthetic elements 
cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian 
elements.”249  Interestingly, the Second Circuit recently cited both 
Traffix and Brandir in virtually the same breath in analyzing the 
issues of trade dress protection and functionality for a watch 
design.250 
 
 245 Id. at 1143, 1147–48. 
 246 Id. at 1147–48. 
 247 Id. at 1145 (quoting Robert Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A 
Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741 (1983)). 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. at 1146–47. See Weinberg, supra note 142, at 49–51(discussing Brandir Int’l, 
Inc, 834 F.2d 1142). 
 250 Cartier, Inc. v. Sardell Jewelry, Inc., 294 Fed.Appx. 615, 620 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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Admittedly, the analysis employed in copyright law to 
determine conceptual separability for pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works is not an exact mirror image of the analysis in 
trademark law to assess functionality and aesthetic functionality.  
Judge Newman, dissenting in Carol Barnhart, noted a slight 
distinction,251 and Judge Oakes in Brandir mentioned this 
distinction as well.252  Nevertheless, although the ultimate 
questions may vary in a nuanced manner, the similarities between 
the methods of examination far outnumber and outweigh the minor 
differences.  Thus, when confronted with issues that require courts 
to apply the doctrines of functionality and aesthetic functionality in 
the context of trademarks or trade dress, courts will benefit from 
borrowing the analytical sorting mechanisms used in precedent 
cases involving conceptual separability in copyright law. 
 
C. Idea-Expression Analysis 
The Copyright Act articulates the principle that copyright 
protects expression but not ideas: “In no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”253  
The classic, chestnut case that established this principle is Baker v. 
Selden.254  The issue in Baker centered on the scope of copyright 
protection in “a book, entitled ‘Selden’s Condensed Ledger, or 
Book-keeping Simplified,’ the object of which was to exhibit and 
explain a peculiar system of book-keeping.”255  The Court 
presented the question as follows: “whether the exclusive property 
in a system of book-keeping can be claimed, under the law or 
copyright, by means of a book in which that system is 
 
 251 Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 420 n.1 (2d Cir. 1985) 
 252 Brandir International, In c. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
 253 17 U.S.C.S. § 102 (2006). 
 254 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
 255 Id. at 100. 
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explained?”256  Justice Bradley made it clear that the defendant 
was free to borrow the plaintiff’s ideas and methods, because the 
scope of the plaintiff’s copyright did not extend to the overall 
“plan”: “[t]he copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure 
the exclusive right to make, sell, and use account-books prepared 
upon the plan set forth in such book.”257  Subsequently, judges 
have labored to articulate a workable process by which to 
determine what elements of a work may be protectable by 
copyright versus those elements that represent merely the plan or 
general idea, and thus, are not copyrightable. 
The venerable Judge Learned Hand authored several opinions 
that have provided useful insight into this process.  One such 
opinion is Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation.258  In 
Nichols, Judge Hand set the stage: “The plaintiff is the author of a 
play, ‘Abie’s Irish Rose,’ which it may be assumed was properly 
copyrighted . . . .  The defendant produced publicly a motion 
picture play, ‘The Cohens and The Kellys,’ which the plaintiff 
alleges was taken from it.”259  In holding that the defendant’s 
movie did not infringe the plaintiff’s play, Judge Hand explained 
that, like Baker v. Selden, the scope of the plaintiff’s copyright did 
not encompass either the plaintiff’s ideas or macroscopic structure: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great 
number of patterns of increasing generality will fit 
equally well, as more and more of the incident is 
left out.  The last may perhaps be no more than the 
most general statement of what the play is about, 
and at times might consist only of its title; but there 
is a point in this series of abstractions where they 
are no longer protected, since otherwise the 
playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to 
which, apart from their expression, his property is 
 
 256 Id. at 101. 
 257 Id. at 104. 
 258 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 259 Id. at 120.  
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never extended.  Nobody has ever been able to fix 
that boundary, and nobody ever can.260 
To be sure, Judge Hand here identified an important aspect of 
the idea-expression  analysis.  In determining where the line ought 
to be drawn between idea and expression, we must realize that, by 
definition, the idea falls on the most general end of a continuum 
and the expression falls on the most specific end of the same 
continuum.  Elements necessary to communicate a general idea are 
not protectable by copyright because others are free to copy an 
author’s ideas, but elements that go beyond what is necessary to 
communicate the idea are protectable because others do not need 
to use such elements—elements that are not dictated by the idea 
itself.  When a copyist takes elements that are not dictated by the 
general idea, she takes elements that may comprise an author’s 
protectable expression.  Conceptually, this is precisely the analysis 
involved in the trademark inquiry regarding both genericity and 
functionality where elements necessary to communicate the nature 
of the product (genericity) or the style or general idea (aesthetic 
functionality) are not protectable.261 
 
 260 Id. at 121 (citation omitted).  This has come to be known as Judge Hand’s 
“abstractions test.”  See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 
61 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 261 See Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc. 58 F.3d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 
1995).  Writing for the court, Judge Newman expressly recognized this very analogy:  
Drawing the line between “ideas” or “concepts” on the one hand and 
“concrete expressions” on the other may sometimes present close 
questions.  Often a helpful consideration will be the purpose of trade 
dress law: to protect an owner of a dress in informing the public of 
the source of its products, without permitting the owner to exclude 
competition from functionally similar products.  The line-drawing 
task is analytically no different than applying Learned Hand’s 
“abstractions” test in the copyright field, see Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp. to distinguish an unprotectable idea from a protectable 
expression of the idea.  The level of generality at which a trade dress 
is described, as well as the fact that a similar trade dress is already 
being used by manufacturers of other kinds of products, may indicate 
that that dress is no more than a concept or idea to be applied to 
particular products. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian262 represents, in 
many respects, one of the most useful copyright cases to consider 
for purposes of this discussion.  The plaintiff sold pieces of 
jewelry, pins in the shape of a bee.263  The defendant made and 
also sold bee-shaped pins.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was asked to analyze the scope of the copyright for the 
product’s design, the object’s shape.  Judge Browning succinctly 
stated the rule: “A copyright . . . bars use of the particular 
‘expression’ of an idea in a copyrighted work but does not bar use 
of the ‘idea’ itself.  Others are free to utilize the ‘idea’ so long as 
they do not plagiarize its ‘expression.’”264  In sum, the court 
reasoned that “[a] jeweled bee pin is therefore an ‘idea’ that 
defendants were free to copy.”265  What is especially significant, is 
that the court recognized that the artistic elements that were 
necessary to communicate “bee-ness” (i.e., the idea of a bee) were 
not protectable within the scope of copyright law.266  This is 
exactly the same reasoning that the Wallace v. Godinger court used 
when it determined that the artistic elements of the plaintiff’s 
silverware that were necessary to communicate “Baroque-ness” 
were not protectable within the scope of trademark or trade dress 
law.267  In this regard, the Baroque “style” is analogous to the idea 
of a bee-shaped pin.  In Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, Judge 
Browning noted that the overlap of appearance between the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s pins was due to the elements necessary 
to evoke the concept of a bee.268  Thus, since the scope of the 
plaintiff’s copyright could not extend to the elements necessary to 
evoke the idea of a bee, there was no infringement.269  According 
to the court, “[t]here is no greater similarity between the pins of 
 
 262 Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 263 See id. at 739. 
 264 Id. at 741. 
 265 Id. at 742. 
 266 See id. at 741. 
 267 See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80–81 
(2d Cir. 1990). 
 268 See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 
1971). 
 269 Id. 
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plaintiff and defendants than is inevitable from the use of jewel-
encrusted bee forms in both.”270 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Wal-Mart fashioned new law.271  In 
order for a product design to serve as protectable trade dress or as a 
trademark, that design must first acquire a secondary meaning.272  
Such a rule is both unnecessary and unwarranted.  It is unnecessary 
because proper application of the traditional Abercrombie rubric 
and the doctrines of utilitarian functionality and aesthetic 
functionality serve the same purpose, only better.  The Court 
justifies its new law, in part, by remarking that, like colors, product 
shapes rarely automatically communicate source identification—in 
a trademark sense—to consumers.273  According to the Court: “In 
the case of product design, as in the case of color, we think 
consumer predisposition to equate the feature with the source does 
not exist.  Consumers are aware of the reality that, almost 
invariably, even the most unusual of product designs—such as a 
cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin—is intended not to identify 
the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more 
appealing.”274  Features that “render the product itself more useful 
and appealing”275 are, by definition, either functional in a 
utilitarian sense or aesthetically functional.276  The Wal-Mart rule 
is unwarranted because it actually confuses the pivotal issue in 
such cases and because it fails to protect the public domain 
adequately.  The pivotal issue in such cases is whether the 
elements of a product’s design (i.e., the design for which the 
putative mark owner seeks protection) communicate source-
identification or whether they perform a utilitarian objective or 
communicate a style, genre, or idea.  If those elements perform a 
 
 270 Id. at 742; see Oddi, supra note 124, at 955–56 (discussing several cases denying 
trademark protection for jewelry designs based on aesthetic functionality). 
 271 See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 272 See id. at 214. 
 273 See id. at 213. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
 276 See id. 
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utilitarian objective, they are functional in a utilitarian sense.  If 
they communicate a style, genre, or idea, they are functional in an 
aesthetic sense.  The Wal-Mart tripartite test shifts the court’s 
focus to the issue of secondary meaning rather than the most 
pertinent questions; namely, the Abercrombie analysis and 
functionality.277  Secondary meaning is irrelevant when a putative 
mark is generic or functional.278  It is only relevant when a putative 
mark is descriptive.279  Artificially categorizing colors and product 
shapes as “descriptive” is unprincipled logic.  The Wal-Mart 
tripartite analysis leaves the door open for aesthetically functional 
colors and designs to gain trademark protection if the owner 
succeeds in proving secondary meaning.  This would rob the 
public domain at the expense of competitors who have a legitimate 
interest in retaining the right to use functional colors and designs.  
Over-emphasis on secondary meaning in cases involving colors 
and product designs may serve as a decoy that distracts the 
decision-maker from the more important functionality, genericity, 
and descriptiveness inquiries. 
The experience of the judiciary’s construction of the Copyright 
principles of conceptual separability and the idea-expression 
dichotomy offers guidance in the process of analyzing 
functionality and aesthetic functionality in the context of product 
shapes.  Using these analogues, courts will be able better to assess 
the protectability of product shapes as trademarks or trade dress.  
As is true in applying the idea-expression dichotomy when dealing 
 
 277 Professor Dinwoodie recognized the importance of analyzing putative trademarks 
and trade dress using the Abercrombie principles and the functionality doctrine as 
opposed to their “ontological status. “ Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 652–53 (noting that 
“the Qualitex Court acknowledged that it is distinctiveness, ‘the source-distinguishing 
ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign—
that permits it to serve [the] basic purposes [of trademark protection.].’” And it is the 
concept of functionality that prevents trade dress protection from inhibiting the 
competition it is intended to promote or frustrating the purpose of the patent law with 
which it co-exists. Modern trademark analysis must therefore focus on the purposes of 
protection—both what trademark is intended to do (protect source-identification) and 
what it is not intended to do (impede competition or serve as a surrogate for patent law). 
Conceptual inquiries directly implementing these limited purposes of trademark set the 
parameters of protection.”) 
 278 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 279 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000). 
C03_VERSTEEG (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2013  1:00 PM 
2013] REEXAMINING TWO PESOS, QUALITEX & WAL-MART 1309 
with two and three-dimensional works of art, the task will not 
always be easy.  Judge Hand expressed this eloquently and 
insightfully: 
Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an 
imitator has gone beyond copying the “idea,” and 
has borrowed its “expression.” Decisions must 
therefore inevitably be ad hoc.  In the case of 
designs, which are addressed to the aesthetic 
sensibilities of an observer, the test is, if possible, 
even more intangible.  No one disputes that the 
copyright extends beyond a photographic 
reproduction of the design, but one cannot say how 
far an imitator must depart from an undeviating 
reproduction to escape infringement.  In deciding 
that question one should consider the uses for which 
the design is intended, especially the scrutiny that 
observers will give to it as used.280 
Judge Friendly explained the most important and essential 
principles of trademark law in Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting 
World.  Justice White reminded us of the soundness of those 
principles in Two Pesos when he said that “[t]here is no persuasive 
reason to apply to trade dress a general requirement of secondary 
meaning which is at odds with the principles generally applicable 
to infringement suits under § 43(a).”281  Punctuating his point, a 
point that both Justices Breyer and Scalia seem to have missed 
later, he stated without equivocation: 
Where secondary meaning does appear in the 
statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982 ed.), it is a 
requirement that applies only to merely descriptive 
marks and not to inherently distinctive ones.  We 
see no basis for requiring secondary meaning for 
inherently distinctive trade dress protection under § 
43(a) but not for other distinctive words, symbols, 
 
 280 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 281 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 770 (1992). 
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or devices capable of identifying a producer’s 
product.282 
Justice Breyer may have veered slightly off-course in Qualitex 
if he actually meant to create a per se rule, requiring colors to 
acquire a secondary meaning as a condition precedent to being 
protectable as trademarks.  But in Wal-Mart Justice Scalia plainly 
took a wrong turn when he laid down the law that secondary 
meaning is explicitly required for both colors and product shapes 
to qualify for status as trademarks or trade dress.  Ignoring the 
teachings of Abercrombie for colors and product shapes makes no 
sense.  Admittedly, one of the problems with analyzing the trade 
dress protectability of product designs, as occurs so often with 
many legal problems, is that “what seems to be a simple question 
turns out to be a very large array of problems that involve whole 
philosophies of law and an inevitable degree of subjectivity.”283  
The analysis suggested in this Article will require abstract thinking 
rather than reliance on concrete subject matter categorization.  But 
such metaphysical, abstract reasoning often lies at the heart of 
sound intellectual property analysis.  This is nothing new.  
Historically speaking, some of the earliest human writing used the 
symbolism of an object’s shape to convey linguistic meaning.284  It 
is time for the judiciary to recalculate its position, acknowledge 
Wal-Mart as an unfortunate lapse of attention, and apply a 
functionality analysis within the context of the Abercrombie rubric 
when asked to determine whether a color or product shape 




 282 Id. at 774 (emphasis added).  
 283 JEROME HALL, Foundations of Jurisprudence 135 (1973). 
 284 See SIR ALAN GARDINER, EGYPT OF THE PHARAOHS 19–26 (1961); supra note 128 
regarding the Ancient Egyptian use of “ideograms.” 
